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ABSTRACT
For several decades, the ascendency of the Pharma & Biotech sector was largely driven by
favorable macro-economic conditions combined with an astonishing level of innovation and a clear
focus on addressing unmet medical needs. Significant R&D investments led to innovative drugs that
changed clinical practice across multiple illnesses and contributed to an overall rise in life
expectancy around the world.
Unfortunately, this trend has not continued. Since the mid-90s', the approval of novel drugs
has plummeted despite record levels of R&D investment. It is estimated that between 2000 and
2010, the top 10 global Pharma and Biotech companies have collectively invested over $500 Billion
in R&D. In the same period, only about 150 novel drugs entered the market. This is partly
explained by the fact that quick-wins have been harvested, and that further progress in treating
grievous illness is harder to achieve. This is compounded by increasing concerns about the long-
term safety of drugs and the conservative regulatory climate that has prevailed since 2000. In this
challenging regulatory and cost environment, the basic economic model of the industry is now
being questioned. In this work I review the recent financial performance of ten major global
pharmaceutical companies, and the challenges faced by the industry in moving from a
deterministic, blockbuster era to a more stochastic era defined by multiple unknowns.
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Title: Charles E. and Susan T. Harris Professor, Professor of Finance
3
Acknowledgements
The Sloan Fellows program at MIT has been an extraordinary experience in more ways
than I can describe. It is rare for most people to have the opportunity to relive their graduate
school experience many years after the initial adventure. To be able to do so with 101 other
remarkable "Fellow" adventurers at a storied institution that is MIT is nothing short of a
miracle. Many people made this miracle possible.
I'd like to thank John Van Maanen for being the soul of the Sloan School and for his
passionate support for all students. He encouraged me to make the most of every minute at
MIT and pursue a thesis. It has been a privilege to learn from so many extraordinary people -
each of whom reminded us every day that teaching is indeed the most noble of all professions.
Simon Johnson, Joe Santos, Joe Weber, Retsef Levi, Robert Merton, Duncan Simester, Rob
Freund, Ernie Berndt, Nelson Repenning, Bill Pounds, Antoinette Schoar, Andrey Zarur,
Jonathan Fleming, Joost Bonson, Ed Boyden, and so many others - many thanks for stretching
my neurons to the limit! Thank you Stephen, Marsha, Mark, and Mary for your unyielding
support and constant encouragement. Monique, Emily, Krishna, Fernando, Sergio, Ricardo,
John Grossman, Arthur, Julian, Hide, Dr. Ros, Vinay, and all of my dear SF'12 friends -thanks for
being there for me when I needed you. We will remain friends forever.
My thesis advisor Andrew Lo reminded me that learning never stops. It has been an
extraordinary privilege to work with Andrew and his team - Chema, Amy, Chris, Jayna, and so
many others. I'd like to express my deepest gratitude to Andrew for making me a part of his
group, and teaching me that with insight, passion, and knowledge, even the biggest problems in
the world can be solved. Andrew, we will beat cancer.
MIT would have remained a distant dream had it not been for the undying support of
my family. I owe a lifetime of gratitude to my "angels" Dhruv, Chirag, Sumathi, Rajam, Nirmala,
Ravi, Chikki, and my mother Prema, for making this possible. My wife Sumathi is my ultimate
role model - the epitome of love, support, loyalty and hard work. The untold sacrifices that
each of them made is beyond compare. I am the luckiest person alive to have them in my life.
4
[Page intentionally left blank]
5
Table of Contents
Chapter ....................................................................................................................................................... 7
Introduction...............................................................................................................................................7
The Pharm aceutical Industry ..................................................................................................................... 8
Chapter 2.....................................................................................................................................................18
The Role of Regulation ............................................................................................................................ 18
Scale-Up & Com m ercial M anufacturing ............................................................................................. 24
Intellectual Property Considerations..............................................26
Patents ................ ...................................................................................................... 28
The Im pact of Patent Expiry................................................................................................................. 30
Chapter 3 ............ ................................................................................................................ 34
Chapter 4..................................................................................................................................................... 62
Identifying Unknow ns ............................................................................................................................. 65
The Value of Strategic Bets..................................................................................................................... 68
Conclusions & Recom m endations...........................................................................................................73
Suggestions for future work ........................................................................................................... 76
Appendix A .................................................................................................................................................. 78
References...................................................................................................................................................98
6
Chapter 1
Introduction
The relentless increase in healthcare costs in the US stands in sharp contrast to
measurable outcomes in the overall health of our population. On a per-capita expenditure
basis, Americans should be disease-free and living forever! At nearly 18% of GDP, healthcare
spending has become a clear and present danger to the US economy, and by extension, the
ability of the US to compete in a rapidly evolving global landscape. Resolving the healthcare
crisis in the US has become one of the key issues of our time, and the intense interest
generated by the recent debate in the United Sates Supreme Court in its consideration of the
Affordable Care Act of 2011 is indicative of the essential importance of this issue. More
broadly, the economic, social, and moral implications of access to healthcare play an important
role in every region of the World.
Much has been written in recent literature about the dramatic impact of the rising cost
of healthcare. However, there is little consensus on why the costs continue to increase, let
alone any potential solutions that may be on the horizon. Vested interests often find creative
ways to deflect the cost discussion, choosing instead to diffuse public debate by implicating the
opaque nature of the system, and the misalignment of the interests of the various participants
in the healthcare system. These participants include patients and consumers of healthcare on
the one hand, and an extensive set of "providers,", "payers" and "regulators" on the other hand.
In its purest form, the demand for healthcare services is met by a supply of such services
by a range of providers. Established economic and finance theory would suggest that in an
environment with visible demand and competent suppliers who can meet that demand, market
forces should prevail. If as in other sectors of the economy, market forces did prevail in
healthcare; those patients and consumers of healthcare services who can participate in the
market would benefit from the theoretical efficiency of the market, and would get the best
available services at "market" prices. Competition would drive innovation, and those suppliers
who cannot sustain their competitive edge over time would disappear. However, the
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healthcare market is not efficient. Leading economists have challenged the broader notion of
market efficiency, and have made compelling arguments that suggest that market efficiency is
at best fleeting, and flawed.
Healthcare is not optional - every person in the world will need access to healthcare at
some point in their lifetime, often multiple times. Several countries around the world have
made this fact central to their healthcare policies. Most western economies have adopted
some form of a single payer system in which essential services for the entire population are
paid for by a central authority (e.g. the National Health Service in the United Kingdom) and
provided by designated entities who provide products and services at some pre-established,
and regulated price. From a macro-economic perspective this seems to work quite well in
countries like Canada, The United Kingdom, France and others. Everyone has access to
essential products and services, while access to non-essential or optional services is more
tightly controlled, and in some cases only available to those with adequate wealth to pay for
these products and services. These models of healthcare delivery have been in existence for
some time and have been extensively studied, and will not be the focus of this work.
The Pharmaceutical Industry
The value of the global pharmaceutical market in 2013 is estimated to exceed $975
billion, and is expected to grow at 4 - 6 percent on a constant dollar basis. This forecast is
provided by IMS Health, a leading provider of aggregated data for the healthcare industry, and
it predicts global pharmaceutical market sales to grow at a 4 - 7 percent compound annual
growth rate (CAGR) through 2013, and takes into account the impact of the global
macroeconomic conditions, the changing mix of innovative and mature products, and the rising
influence of healthcare access and funding on market demand.
In the pharmaceutical industry, nothing is quite as exciting or purposeful as building and
advancing a robust, dynamic pipeline of new molecules that have the potential to address
unmet medical needs. The biopharmaceutical sector in the United States is the global leader in
R&D and medical innovation, with several hundred new drugs approved by the FDA in the last
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decade - a resounding success by any measure. Many of these scientific breakthroughs led to
dramatic improvements in the overall health of people around the world. The success and
productivity of their pipelines drove significant financial returns to their shareholders, and
spurred additional investments in R&D. It is estimated that in 2011, the biopharmaceutical
sector in the United States invested over $100 billion in R&D, with nearly 3000 compounds
being studied across a range of diseases.
Table 1.1. Drugs under development in 2011 by major diseases. (Source: Adis R&D Insight
Database and PhRMA).
Condition Number of Medicines
in Development
Alzheimer's and
Other Dementias
Arthritis
Cancer
Breast Cancer
Colorectal Cancer
Lung Cancer
Leukemia
Skin Cancer
98
74
878
125
82
120
119
86
Cardiovascular
Disorders
Diabetes Mellitus
HIV/AIDS
Mental and behavioral
Disorders
Parkinson's Disease
Respiratory Disorders
Rare Diseases2
Source: Adis R&D Insight Database and PhRMA S
The impact of these R&D efforts is felt around the world. Life expectancy in most
regions of the world is at an all-time high. Diseases once considered incurable and life-ending
have been converted into chronic conditions that can be effectively managed with medications.
Chronic conditions that once drained productivity are now controlled with medications such
that most people with these ailments can contribute more effectively to the economy and
society at large.
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Fig. 1.1. Life expectancy at birth (in years) in the United States (Source: Centersfor Disease
Control (CDC), USA).
Patients suffering from heart disease, many types of cancers, HIV/AIDS, diabetes, and
many other illnesses have seen dramatic improvements in their health, productivity, and quality
of life. In the US alone, the economic burden of chronic illnesses is enormous. Published
figures estimate the annual economic cost to the US economy at over $250 billion from heart
disease, diabetes, and cancer alone. The discovery of effective medicines for these indications
has been an important factor in the overall improvement in the outlook for these patients,
many of whom now live more productive lives.
These improvements in the overall health of the population do come at a cost.
Prescription drugs make up about 12% of the overall cost of healthcare in the United States, or
about 2% of GDP. About 40% of this is tax financed through programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid. Another 40% is financed through insurance, with the remaining 20% being funded
directly by patients. The recent debate on the unsustainability of healthcare costs has brought
the cost of prescription drugs into sharp focus. The biopharmaceutical industry is now faced
with a substantial challenge of demonstrating that innovative drugs can truly provide
differentiated benefit to patients - benefits that significantly outweigh costs. For people with
serious illnesses, this debate is very meaningful.
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Adverse Events Among Patients with Coronary Disease' in a Study of 14 Countries
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or Pulmonary Edema of Hospital Discharge
Source: K. Fox, et al
Fig. 1.2. Impact of CV medicines in reducing Adverse Events in Cardiac patients. (Source:
PhRMA)
Even today, the term "cancer" still strikes fear in those who are diagnosed with this
dreaded disease. However, significant progress has been made in improving our understanding
the complex world of oncology. Improved diagnostic methods which can help with early
detection combined with better, more targeted drugs have contributed to major gains in
combating some specific types of cancers such as breast cancer and prostate cancer. Despite
these advances, we are a long way from declaring victory over cancer. Cancer biology is
complex, and progress in understanding the fundamental aspects of this disease is takes time.
Progress is slow, and much more work remains to be done before most forms of cancer are
either prevented or effectively treated.
The biopharmaceutical industry has built effective partnerships with publically funded
R&D organizations such as the National Institutes of Health, and academic institutions to bring
advances in cancer biology to the clinic. These collaborations have produced stunning results in
many areas of oncology, and have benefitted millions of people around the world. However,
these productive collaborations have recently come under pressure due to budgetary
constraints, and could slow the progress of translating basic research into drugs that can
benefit patients.
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FiN. 1.3. Annual reduction in cancer deaths in the US, 1975 - 2006. (Source: D.K Epsey et al;
B.K. Edwards et al; PhRMA).
In addition to the progress being made in treating conditions such as heart disease and
cancer, breakthroughs in less common conditions have resulted from R&D efforts from many
innovative companies. Between 1997 and 2010, more than 200 new drugs were approved for
the treatment of rare diseases. In the United States, the term "rare disease" has a specific
regulatory meaning and refers to those diseases that affect less than 200,000 people. It is
noteworthy that until recently, for most patients suffering a rare disease there were no
treatment options.
The significant increase in the R&D efforts directed towards rare diseases is a good
example of the collaborative effort by the biopharmaceutical industry, academia, and the FDA.
The FDA Office of Orphan Products Development (OOPD) was set up with the express purpose
of advancing the evaluation and development of products for the diagnosis and treatment of
rare diseases. Initially, those companies engaged in addressing the needs of patients with rare
diseases were not expected to recover their R&D and marketing costs, and the FDA provided
incentives such as accelerated review for other, non-orphan submissions from these
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companies. More recently, orphan drugs have proven to be immensely profitable. This is shift
towards obtaining an orphan designation, particularly in oncology, is significant.
Number of Drug Approvals for Rare Diseases"
250
200
> 1502
50
-10
0
1970s 1983-1996 1997-2010
Comprehensive record keeping on drug approvats for rare diseases began n 1983, when the Orphan
Drug Act was passed. Data for 1970s is approximate. Data for 2010 is partia1. anuary th rough June Source: FDA
Fig. 1.4. Number of drug approvals for Rare Diseases, 1970s - 2010. (Source: US FDA)
There is little doubt that the biopharmaceutical industry's commitment to R&D and
innovation has a direct and measurable benefit to patients, and has played a role in controlling
overall healthcare costs. In the case of a chronic illness like diabetes, there is direct evidence
from the experience of clinicians and payers that there is a nearly 50% reduction in annual
healthcare costs for patients taking an effective diabetes drug.
This is indicative of the fact that in the United States, the biopharmaceutical industry is
one of the most R&D-intensive sectors of the economy. Most large companies in this sector
routinely invest between 15% and 25% of annual revenue in R&D. This level of investment was
seen as fundamental to the survival and future growth of the industry, and was rewarded by
investors, who more often than not viewed a thriving pipeline as a positive indicator of future
earnings.
Much of this has changed. The biopharmaceutical sector is not immune to the recent
economic challenges. At a time when the United States and indeed much of the world, is facing
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unprecedented economic challenges, the underlying business model of the R&D intensive
biopharmaceutical industry has come under increased scrutiny. This business model is defined
by the significant risk and major investments in R&D that are recouped by only two of every 10
approved medicines. This is in sharp contrast to other industries where more than one in three
investments in R&D and product development can yield significant financial returns.
Just Two in 10 Approved Medicines Produce Revenues that Exceed Average R&D Costs
$2,000
S1.500
C $1,000
After-Tax Average R&D Costs
fd_ S500
$29 $162 $87 S39 $21 $6 (-$1)so- --
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
New Medicines Introduced Between 1990 and 1994. Grouped by Tenths, by Lifetime Sales
Source: J.A Vernon, J.H. Golec, and J A DiMasi-
Fig. 1.5. Only two out of every 10 new drugs launched will recoup R&D costs.
(Source: J. A.DiMasi et al)
In the face of these economic challenges, most of the biopharmaceutical companies that
I studied have initiated a strategic review of the key factors that impact the industry and their
companies. The less than stellar financial returns of these companies in the last few years, has
led shareholders to question the underlying risk inherent to the industry.
Changes in the market dynamics, the growing influence of payers in determining the
reimbursement levels for drugs, increased scrutiny from regulators, competition from emerging
markets such as China and India, and changes in the intellectual property landscape are all key
factors that must be addressed to restore the health of the industry.
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Fig. 1.6. Expected normalized growth in Net Income (CAGR) 2011 - 2018 for the companies
participating in this study. (Data Source: Evaluate Pharma)
Table 1.2. Worldwide prescription drug sales of the companies in the study. 2011 & 2018.
(Source: Evaluate Pharma)
Worldwide Prescription Rx SalesI Rankingl Market Share
I-I
I
Prescription (Rx) Pharnaceuticals Data
2011 2018W
Novartis 46,675 50,8691
Pfizer 53,547 46,899
GlaxoSmithKllne 34,972 46,000
Roche 37,038 44,765
Merck & Co 41,75 40,696
Johnson & Johnson 22,304 27,083
Abbott Laboratories 22,435 24,493
AstraZeneca 32,36 22,375
Aungen 15,25 14,800
Eli Lily 20,397 13,578
Sum 326,904 331,558
Rest of Market :388,997 552,262
Total Market 715,902 883,820
CAGR
+1%
-2%
+4%
+3%
+0%
+3%
+1%
-5%V
+0%
+0%
+5%
+3%
Market Share
2011 2018
6.5%
7.5%
4.9%
5.2%
5.8%
3.1%
3.1%
4.5%
2.1%
2.8%
45.7%
54.3%
5.8%
5.3%
5.2%
5.1%
4.6%
3.1%
2.8%
2.5%
1.7%
1.5%'
37.5%
62.5%
100.0%100.0%
Market Rank
2011 2018
2
1
6
51
3
9
8
7
13
10
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
16
17
15
NdtMA~m gg in 4%W1MOI MMQaW MMCMMAS M O OACW
Since 2000, despite significant increases in R&D spending, the number of new drugs
approved by the FDA has remained about the same. Further, many of the drugs approved by
the FDA failed to meet their initial sales projections.
Annual R&D Spend Vs. NME Approvals
160,000.0 80
140,000.0
70
120,000.0
100,000.0
80,000.0 50
60,000.0
40
40,000.0
30
20,000.0
0.0 1 20
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Annual Pharma R&D Spend -4-Number of NMEs Approved
Fig. 1.7. Annual R&D spending Vs. Number of NMEs approved. (Data Source: US FDA).
Simultaneously, there has been a significant shift in public investment in basic R&D.
Budget cuts at the NIH have led to a reduction in the amount of R&D spending in basic biology,
thus slowing the progress in understanding complex diseases. About 30% of the total annual
budget in disease biology, translational research, and clinical medicine comes from the NIH in
the form of grants to academia and small companies. These grants support basic science and
clinical medicines, often at leading academic institutions around the United States. Many of
these academic institutions are affiliated with teaching hospitals and academic medical centers
(AMC) that play a crucial role in advancing the understanding of disease biology.
In chapter 2, I examine some of the key factors that impact the evolving business model
of the biopharmaceutical industry, and outline the methodology that was used to obtain the
background data that forms the basis of this study. In chapter 3, I examine the financial
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performance of the biopharmaceutical industry and some of the factors impacting the recent
performance of the industry. Finally, in chapter 4, I review some elements of the emerging
business models in the industry, and suggest areas for additional study. I conclude by making a
few specific recommendations that could have a positive impact on the industry in the future.
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Chapter 2
Generally, any pharmaceutical, biotechnology, medical device, or diagnostic company
seeking to develop, test, and market a prescription drug, device, or diagnostic test in the United
States must seek FDA approval. The process of discovering, developing, and eventually bringing
a new drug, device, or product into the market is time consuming and expensive, and the FDA
plays a central role in the industry. It is worth noting that until recently, the FDA was the
undisputed leader in the determining the scientific and medical benefits of any drug, device, or
diagnostic that was on the market. The scientific and medical expertise of the agency was so
strong, that often, regulatory agencies of many other countries simply followed the precedent
set by the FDA in approving or rejecting any given drug, device or diagnostic for their own
domestic markets.
In order to review the R&D process in the appropriate context, it is first useful to briefly
review the essential process that the US FDA follows in evaluating and approving a prescription
drug for use in the United States.
The Role of Regulation
Unlike most other industries, the healthcare industry is highly regulated. Regulatory
bodies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States, the European
Medicines Agency (EMEA), and the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency (PMDA) in
Japan play a significant role in shaping the healthcare environment in their countries, and
indeed around the world. These agencies were created to ensure that consumers of health
services and products in their respective countries would be protected from harm. Mistakes in
healthcare, whether accidental or deliberate, can lead to serious consequences for individuals
and groups of people, including permanent injury, or death.
18
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
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- I CHIPCOiDMI
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Fig. 2.1. Representative Organizational Chart of the United States Food & Drug Administration
(Source: US FDA)
The extensive regulatory authority of the US FDA is illustrated in the organizational chart
of the agency depicted in Figure 2.1. Of particular interest to the Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology industry are three organizations within the FDA - The Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (CDER), The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER), and the Center
for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH). Between them, these three agencies account for
100% of the regulatory oversight for every innovative drug (small molecule or biological drug),
generic drug, medical devices, and medical diagnostics that is developed, tested, and marketed
in the United States.
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Fig. 2.2. The drug development and approval process (Source: US FDA)
As shown in Fig. 2.2., the discovery, clinical development and commercial launch of a
therapeutic drug in the United States is overseen and regulated by the FDA. Most drugs take
between 8- 12 years to go through the process.
First, the industry uses the growing understanding of biology to identify 'targets'. A
target is a naturally occurring biological material (a protein, an enzyme, etc.) in the body that
plays key role in the development of a disease, or the symptoms associated with that disease.
The selection of the biological target is very important, since it is essential to establish a clear
link between the disease of interest and the underlying biological target. Once such a target
has been validated, the next step is to identify a synthetic chemical compound, natural (often
20
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plant-derived) compound, or a biological material such as a protein or antibody that could
modulate the activity of a given biological target. Since the attrition rate of such compounds at
this earliest stage of the drug development is very high, technologies such as automation,
robotics, informatics, high-throughput screening are employed to identify "hits" that might be
suitable to progress to the next stage of the discovery process.
After the "hits" are identified, they are further tested to verify that they are indeed
"valid hits" - those that demonstrate genuine activity in the biological assay that represents the
activity of the disease target under study. These "validated hits" are tested in secondary
biological assays to further ascertain their biological activity. Typically, only a small fraction of
the initial set of hits will progress to further testing. These verified hits are termed "leads", and
mark an important decision point in the early discovery process.
Almost always, these lead compounds need further improvement. Such improvement
is necessary to enhance the selectivity of the compound to ensure that it acts primarily on the
disease target for which it was tested. In addition, the lead optimization process is designed to
ensure that desirable "drug like" properties are improved. Optimizing these drug like
properties ensures that once fully developed and tested, the drug will be absorbed by the body
(bioavailability), reach the desired point in the body to find the appropriate target
(pharmacodynamics), remain in the body for the right duration (pharmacokinetics), have
minimal side effects (off-target effects), and can be manufactured efficiently, and cost
effectively. Each of these steps marks a significant commitment of resources - both people and
capital. Mistakes made at this stage of the discovery process are very costly.
Once a lead compound is optimized, additional testing is performed. These tests are
performed "in vitro" with living cells that are representative of the disease condition, in tissue
cultures that might better represent the biological target, or "in vivo" in live animals (mice, rats,
dogs, etc.). This stage of "pre-clinical" testing marks another important decision point. Any
compound which does not pass the stringent safety testing that is performed at this stage will
not progress into human clinical trials. A compound that successfully passes the pre-clinical
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stage of testing is called a "clinical candidate", and upon further review, it will likely progress
into human clinical trials.
However, before any human trials can commence, a clinical trial protocol is developed.
This protocol provides a detailed definition, methods and procedures, expected outcomes, and
operational parameters of the proposed clinical trial. The protocol undergoes rigorous review
by an independent committee consisting of experienced independent scientific experts,
practicing physicians, and researchers with expertise in the field. The committee will review
the ethical standards of the clinical trial design. Difficult questions such as who gets the drug
Vs. the placebo, whether children are included in the trial, how sick the patients participating in
the trial will be, etc. This review process is comprehensive, and the committee has final
authority on whether a trial can commence. The committee also has the authority to halt a trial
for any reason that might potentially harm a patient.
Nature Reviews I Drug Discovery
Fig. 2.3. The drug development "funnel" (Source: Nature Reviews Drug Discovery 6, 636-649
(August 2007))
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Upon the successful completion of pre-clinical testing, and with the approval of the
appropriate review committees, clinical trials can commence. This marks a critical point in the
drug development process. A significant portion of the costs of developing a new drug lies in
the clinical trial phase. Of the nearly $1.5 billion that is required to successfully launch a new
drug, fully 60% or more of the costs are incurred during the conduct of the clinical trials. These
trials may be simple trials with a few patients at a few centers in one geographical location, or
as is the case most often, these trials involve thousands of patients across dozens of centers
around the globe. The safety and well-being of all clinical trial participants is of utmost
importance. Typically, clinical trials are conducted in accordance with guidelines developed by
the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) and the principles contained in the World
Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki on the Ethical Principles for Medical Research
Involving Human Subjects (2008). Clinical trials are conducted in phases as defined below.
* Phase I trials are intended to confirm how the potential new drug is absorbed and
distributed through the human body, and is usually conducted with a small group of
healthy volunteers, except in trials involving potential treatments for certain types of
cancers, where a Phase I trial may involve patients suffering from the actual illness.
* Phase || trials will include a larger number of patients with the condition that the
proposed new drug is intended to treat. The purpose of this phase is to establish
whether the drug will have the beneficial effect on the particular disease process, and
what doses and methods of administration may be most appropriate.
* Phase I|1 trials follow from successful outcomes from Phase 11 trials. This is a much
larger study likely to be conducted with many hundreds (or thousands) of patients in
several countries. Often, multiple Phase III studies are required to meet the regulatory
burden of proof for safety and efficacy, superiority over existing treatment choices, and
economic effectiveness of the new drug.
These three phases of clinical trials may last many years - often more than seven years.
It is important to note that very few drug candidates actually make it all the way through the
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clinical trial process successfully. For most pharmaceutical companies, the cumulative failures
of compounds in clinical trials prove to be very expensive. Failures in the later stages of clinical
trials (phase 11 and beyond) are particularly expensive and damaging. Many years of work, and
hundreds of millions of dollars are lost when a drug candidate fails in the later stage s of clinical
trials.
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
Number of volunteers
20-100, 100H500 1,000-6,000
6-7 Vbar
2 7 'M
-, Y ar
Fij. 2.4. Pharma R&D Process: Timelines, Attrition Rates, and Costs by Stage of R&D. (Source:
US FDA)
The final regulatory step prior to market launch is filing for regulatory approval. In the
United States, once a potential drug candidate has successfully completed all stages of the
clinical trial process, the information gathered throughout the development process in the
laboratory and its clinical trials is submitted to the FDA for review and approval. This process
can take up to two years.
Scale-Up & Commercial Manufacturing
In addition to planning and conducting clinical trials, pharmaceutical companies must
determine how to manufacture and distribute the new drug once approved. Of particular
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interest in this context is the complexity and cost of the manufacturing process. The risks
associated with manufacturing vary by drug class - drugs which are "small" molecules and are
primarily organic compounds derived via synthetic chemistry, Vs. "large" molecules, which are
primarily biological in origin, often in the form of naturally occurring proteins, enzymes, or
antibodies.
For most pharmaceutical companies, the decision to invest in building a new
manufacturing facility or scaling up existing manufacturing capacity is a critical one.
Establishing new manufacturing capabilities is very capital intensive, and can take several years.
Often, the capital required to build and obtain operational clearance from the FDA for a new
manufacturing plant can exceed $1Billion, and take as many as three years. Given these
factors, miscalculating the market potential of a yet-to-be-approved drug can be very costly.
Forecasting the demand, rate of acceptance, and eventual peak sales of any new
medicine is a complex and imperfect science. The recent history of the pharmaceutical industry
is replete with examples of erroneous forecasts that have led to significant negative outcomes
for the involved companies. In late 1999 Immunex Corporation's breakthrough biological drug
Enbrel was seen as a major biotech success, and became the treatment of choice for many
forms of arthritis. Revenues from Enbrel surpassed $1 Billion in less than three years, and
Immunex was named one of the fastest growing companies in the US. Multiple stock-splits
were declared, and investors were euphoric about Immunex's prospects. Yet, the
unprecedented demand for Enbrel caught Immunex by surprise, and the inability to meet
market demand led to significant pressure on the company's stock price. By 2002, Immunex
had been acquired by Amgen, another biotech success story. Amgen went on to build one of
the most complex and expensive biotech manufacturing plants in the world to manufacture
Enbrel in sufficient quantities. This new manufacturing plant was built at a cost of nearly $2
billion and was eventually approved by the FDA in the mid 2000's.
More recently, major problems in Genzyme's manufacturing plant for one of its flagship
products led to significant disruption in the company's financial performance, and made it
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vulnerable to an acquisition. In 2011, Sanofi, a major European pharmaceutical company
acquired Genzyme to strengthen its' own biologics capabilities.
In addition to a complex, unpredictable, and demanding regulatory environment,
intellectual property and market demand considerations are additional factors in determining
access to prescription drugs, devices, and diagnostics on a global level.
Intellectual Property Considerations
As described earlier, the biopharmaceutical industry operates under a challenging
business model. Companies must make significant investments in R&D, much of which will
need to be made 10 to 15 years before the approval and market entry of any products. A
significant element in assuring shareholders that these speculative investments are worthwhile
is the promise of intellectual property protection. It is now reasonably well established that the
drug pipelines of most companies are seen as speculative investments, with future cash flows
at risk from a variety of factors, some predictable and others not so predictable. Until recently,
intellectual property protection in the United States was considered highly predictable, and
formed the backbone of the core R&D strategy of many biopharmaceutical companies.
The patent system in the United States is a major driver of innovation and commerce.
Without it, bold entrepreneurs and established companies could not take the risk of making
substantial early investments to develop and refine a successful product. More broadly, recent
changes in the intellectual property landscape around the world have had a major impact on
the biopharmaceutical industry.
We have stated before that R&D is not only expensive, but it is also risky. Only one in a
thousand compounds that originate in discovery research reach clinical trials, and less than 20%
of those compounds that are clinical trials gain approval form the FDA. Further, obtaining FDA
approval is no guarantee of market success, and as shown earlier, only 20% of marketed drugs
recoup their R&D costs. A logical question that follows is why would the industry embark on
this process in the first place?
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The larger societal implications of this fundamental question are the subject of much
academic research. Suffice it to say that at some fundamental level, the biopharmaceutical
industry is genuinely motivated by bringing life-changing, and in many instances life-saving
drugs to patients who need them. Yet, in a market driven economic system, every company
must also be held accountable to its shareholders. The protection, market exclusivity, and
other incentives provided by a robust and efficient intellectual property system are key to
enabling investors in making informed investment decisions that ultimately make it possible for
companies to make the necessary investments.
An effective and robust intellectual property system must promote fair and meaningful
incentives for innovation, it must provide a high degree of certainty to innovators regarding
their rights under the system, and it must provide for a strong enforcement mechanism for
resolving violations of intellectual property. The absence of any one of these essential
elements can severely erode the confidence in the system, and drive innovation away.
In the next section, I examine the salient aspects of the intellectual property system as it
impacts the biopharmaceutical industry. Recently, the industry has been the subject of much
criticism for its relatively unyielding stance on intellectual property. At issue is the ability of
non-innovator companies to make "copies" of the innovators drugs, and introduce these
"generic" drugs into the market, thus driving prices down. Some would argue that the
introduction of generics is a good thing since it reduces the overall cost of healthcare. In an
environment where healthcare costs are a significant source of intellectual, political and even
judicial debate, the role of an effective intellectual property system has become even more
critical.
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), "Intellectual property
refers to the exclusive rights granted by the State over creations of the human mind, in
particular, inventions, literary and artistic works, distinctive signs and designs used in
commerce. Intellectual property is divided into two main categories: industrial property rights,
which includes patents, utility models, trademarks, industrial designs, trade secrets, new
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varieties of plants and geographical indications; and copyright and related rights, which relate
to literary and artistic works."
For the purposes of this study I will only focus on the "Industrial Property Rights", since
this is most relevant to the biopharmaceutical industry. It is evident that Industrial property
(IP) rights are extremely important for the pharmaceutical industry. The use of the IP system by
the biopharmaceutical industry is driven by the inherent business strategy of the company -
size, resources, innovative capacity, competitive context, global presence, global markets, and
field of expertise.
Established innovator companies with major R&D investments aimed at developing new
drugs or diagnostics rely heavily on the patent system to provide assurance that most of the
R&D costs can be recouped. Emerging biotechnology companies and academic labs with novel
ideas or molecules also rely on the patent system to secure fair licensing deals. A robust
market in licensing is playing an increasingly important role in driving innovation in the
biopharmaceutical industry. Finally, the protected public disclosure enabled by the patent
system plays an important role in the further evolution of the innovation in the industry.
Established and emerging companies rely on the availability of such information to determine
whether they have the "freedom to operate" in shaping their own R&D strategy. Towards the
end of the patent life of an innovator's drug, generics companies rely on the public knowledge
to rapidly build the capabilities needed to introduce safe and efficacious generic copies of
drugs, thus reducing the cost dramatically.
Patents
According to the WIPO, "A patent is an exclusive right granted by the State for an
invention that is new, involves an inventive step (or is non-obvious) and is capable of
industrial application (or useful)." (Source: WIPO Guideline Document, 2011) Once issued, the
holder of a drug patent is given the exclusive right to make and sell the drug, and is able to
prevent others from making, selling, or importing a foreign version of the same drug. Thus, an
28
issued patent is a very important business asset, and forms the basis of establishing a
predictable cash flow from the newly marketed drug.
Most innovative drugs, medical devices, and diagnostics are typically filed under a
"Utility Patent". In an effort to harmonize the intellectual property system world-wide, the
United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), and the WIPO have modified the rules
governing Utility Patents. Under the new rules, all Utility Patents are generally issued for a
period of 20 yearsfrom the date offiling. This is an important change from the previous state,
wherein patents were issued for duration of 17 years from initial disclosure. This change from
"first to disclose" to "first to file" has had a dramatic impact on the intellectual property
strategy of many companies in the biopharmaceutical industry. It is possible that an innovator
company that is not vigilant about the state of scientific progress in its R&D efforts can be pre-
empted by another company that files a patent application for a related product or molecule
first.
In some countries, pharmaceutical products may be granted an additional period of
patent protection to compensate for inefficiencies and delays in obtaining marketing approval
from regulatory agencies. This is of particular significance in several emerging markets such as
China, India, and Brazil, where regulatory approval and marketing approval for a new drug are
granted by separate agencies.
Thus, without adequate intellectual property rights, competitors can easily copy hard
won innovations in biopharmaceutical industry immediately, without incurring the major
expense of R&D. This would negatively impact the innovator companies' ability to recoup their
investments and would erode shareholder value, and make it difficult if not impossible, for the
biopharmaceutical industry to justify making risky and expensive investments in developing
new drugs.
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The Impact of Patent Expiry
The existence of the intellectual property regime played an important role in enabling
the biopharmaceutical industry to discover and market drugs that became extraordinary
financial success stories. In the mid-1980s' SmithKline's proton pump inhibitor drug Tagamet,
which was prescribed for the treatment of peptic ulcers became the first drug in the history of
the industry to reach annual revenues of over $1 Billion. Glaxo's Zantac, another drug for the
treatment of ulcers quickly went on to become a "blockbuster", achieving annual revenues of
over $1B. The era of blockbuster drugs was born. Since then several drugs across many
different therapeutic areas have gone on to become megs-blockbusters, with annual sales
exceeding $3 billion or more. Pfizer's Lipitor which was a lead drug in a class of drugs called
"Statins", went on to become the biggest commercial success of all, achieving annual sales of
nearly $10 Billion.
The era of the blockbuster drugs led to a change in the overall cost structure of the
biopharmaceutical industry. There was a dramatic increase in R&D expenditure, with well over
$500 Billion being spent on developing new drugs by the top 15 global biopharmaceutical
companies between 2000 and 2010. In many cases, this translated to an annual R&D
expenditure of about 20% of revenue for most companies. Much of this money was being
spent on every more risky areas of disease biology, with the allure of successfully launching
more blockbusters into the market.
The complexity of the diseases being addressed by the newly approved drugs also
meant that most companies had to invest heavily in building increasingly sophisticated sales &
marketing organizations. The process of "detailing" a new drug to a prescribing physician
required a well-trained and knowledgeable sales force, with specialized knowledge about the
new drug. In addition, the biopharmaceutical industry embarked on an unprecedented
campaign to bring awareness to patients by initiating a series of "direct to consumers (DTC)"
campaigns. These DTC campaigns quickly transformed patients into consumers, and also
brought in new patients who became better informed about medical conditions that they might
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have previously been unaware of. DTC campaigns were very successful, and led to significant
increases in the number of prescriptions written by physicians. It could be argued that some of
the most successful drugs of the last decade, including Lipitor, Viagra (Pfizer), Enbrel (Amgen),
Humira (Abbott) benefited dramatically form the enhanced sales and marketing efforts of these
companies.
An unintended consequence of the tremendous market success of these drugs was the
fact that the cost to the healthcare system from prescription drugs increased, with a seemingly
direct correlation to the overall increase in healthcare costs. This is paradoxical, since in the
case of drugs such as Lipitor, which helped to lower cardiovascular risk in a large number of
patients, the reduced incidence of serious cardiovascular disease actually led to a reduction in
related healthcare costs.
This cycle of increased spending - from R&D to Sales and Marketing, was largely driven
by industry's desire to pursue the very profitable blockbuster drugs to solve unmet medical
needs for diseases common to many millions of people, often at the expense of other drugs in
the pipeline. This process of developing new drugs coincided with massive consolidation in the
industry, with mega-mergers becoming the norm. The impetus for these mergers (ref) was the
apparent productivity of the collective pipelines of the industry, and the seemingly enviable
financial returns for the companies' shareholders.
However, the era of the blockbuster drug is ending. In the U.S. alone, branded
pharmaceuticals accounting for some US$120 billion in annual revenues have recently come off
patent (including Lipitor, Zyprexa, Plavix, and Seroquel) or will soon be coming off patent in the
next few years. In almost every instance, generic equivalents of the innovator's drug have
entered the market almost immediately, thus eroding a major source of the industry's profits.
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Fiz. 2.5. Annual lost revenue due to patent expiry. (Data Source: Evaluate Pharma)
With the erosion in profits, the spending levels of the blockbuster era are unsustainable.
While there is still much to be done to alleviate human suffering due to diseases for which no
effective treatments are available, it is doubtful if the biopharmaceutical industry will be able to
pursue this goal within the old model of developing exclusive medicines that can enjoy patent
protection for many years.
Developing novel medicines for unsolved medical problems is increasingly difficult.
More than ten years after decoding the human genome, much remains to be done in
translating the breakthroughs in disease understanding brought upon by the Human Genome
Project into useful treatments for many diseases.
We have described the increasing pressures felt by the biopharmaceutical industry from
every direction - from regulators setting the rules for drug effectiveness and safety, from
managed care organizations and employers pushing back on prescription drug costs and
reimbursement, from competitors coming to market with alternative brands or generics, and
from disgruntled shareholders. In addition, the number of promising molecules in the
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collective pipelines of the industry is shrinking, and the risk/reward ratio for R&D spending is
worsening. Overall, these trends have resulted in lower revenue, reduced profitability.
Total Revenue Growth (CAGR 2011-18)
AstraZeneca
ElI Lilly
Pfizer
Amgen
Merck & Co
Novartis
Abbott Laboratories
Roche
Johnson & Johnson
GlaxoSmithKllne
-5% -4% -3% -2% -1%
U 2018
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Fia. 2.6. Projected total revenue growth (CAGR 2011 - 2018) for the ten companies in the
study. (Data Source: Evaluate Pharma)
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Chapter 3
The primary objective of this brief, qualitative study was to provide an assessment of
the incongruence between increased R&D spending by the biopharmaceutical industry, and the
dramatic decline in productivity of the industry's pipeline in the corresponding time period.
This study has focused on the decade beginning in 2000 and ending in 2010.
Ten global biopharmaceutical companies participated in this study. Table 3.1. lists the
names of the companies and a summary of the key financial data of the ten companies. This
data was obtained from publically available financial statements.
Table 3.1. Summary financial data for the companies included in this study. All financial data is
in US$, Millions. (Data Source: Company financial statements).
Eli Lilly 4,379 9.1% 47,879 4,925 -5,414 48,368
Johnson & Johnson 14,557 8.9% 176,702 32,261 -19,627 164,068
Novartis 13,982 9.9% 121,527 5,388 -24,594 140,733
Roche 11,980 7.2% 150,036 13,425 -29,405 166,016
Initial contact with each company was established through the office of Corporate
Communications. The nature and purpose of the study was explained in a 30 minute telephone
conference with an executive from the office of Corporate Communications. Eight of the ten
companies agreed to provide a summary presentation on their R&D strategy, R&D budgets, and
pipeline status. Two of the ten companies were unable to provide the requested information
due to internal guidelines. In all cases, the information provided was available to the public,
and no confidential information of material impact to the company's publically traded stock on
any exchange in the United States or Europe was neither sought nor provided.
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Each of the ten companies directed us to their public websites, wherein the R&D status,
annual reports, financial statements, and other public disclosure documents available to
shareholders were available. In addition to these data sources, I obtained in-depth research
reports on each of these ten companies from selected major investment banks in the United
States and Europe. Additional information for this study was obtained from the US-FDA and
the European Medicines Agency (EMEA). Finally, a detailed review of the current peer-
reviewed literature relevant to this study was conducted. All of this information is cataloged in
Appendix A.
Abbott Laboratories
Abbott Laboratories is a diversified health care company with a more than 120 year
history. Abbott's products include nutritional products, laboratory diagnostics, medical devices,
and pharmaceutical therapies. Over the past decade Abbott has implemented a strategy to
further diversify its range of products, global presence in R&D, and global markets for its
products. Abbott has sales, manufacturing, research and development, and distribution
facilities in several regions around the globe, with a focus on serving customers in the regions in
which they live. Abbott is headquartered in Abbott Park, a suburb of Chicago, in the United
States.
Table 3.2. Breakdown of revenue by business segment for Abbott Laboratories. (Data Source:
Evaluate Pharma)
AbotLaboratories (all financial data in 21 08 C G
US$ Millions)
Other Rx Sales 3,500 10,001 +16%
TotaI WW Pharmaceuticals "22,435 24,493 +1%
Medical Devices & HealthcareSpl 9,934 12,287+3
Total WW Revenues 38,851 46,179 +2%
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Abbott's therapeutic areas of focus in drug development include chronic kidney disease
(CKD), neurosciences (degenerative diseases, pain), immunology (anti-viral therapies),
oncology, diabetes, and inflammation. In a move to improve the performance of the company,
and to better respond to the challenges faced by the industry, Abbott has announced that it will
split into two independent companies, a research-based pharmaceutical company, and a
diversified medical products company. This is a significant move, seen by many in the industry
as key to Abbott's future financial success. The diversified medical products company will
retain the Abbott name and will focus on nutritional products, diagnostics, and medical devices,
while the research-based pharmaceutical company will focus on improving efficiencies and
profit margins in developing and marketing novel drugs.
Abbott Laboratories: WW Prescription (Rx) Pharmaceutical Sales &
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Fi. 3.1. Abbott Laboratories world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected
growth (2004 - 2018). (Data Source: Abbott Labs, Evaluate Pharma)
It is worth noting that Abbott expects its diversified medical products business to grow
at a significantly higher rate, and has stated that the newly created research-based
pharmaceutical company will have a diversified portfolio of small molecule and biological drugs,
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and will have a greater focus on specialty products with smaller markets. In addition, this new
company will expand its geographic presence by entering emerging markets with very different
market dynamics and reimbursement policies.
Amgen Inc.
Amgen is a biotechnology pioneer and has the distinction of discovering and marketing
the first biologic drug to achieve blockbuster status. Erythropoietin (EPO) is a biological drug
that improves the ability of the human body to make more hemoglobin. This is critical for
patients suffering from anemia, which may be caused by a number of diseases including kidney
failure and cancer. Amgen was founded in the mid-1980s and is headquartered in Thousand
Oaks, California.
Amgen's primary areas of disease focus include hematology, oncology, bone health,
inflammation, and neurosciences. Amgen has diversified its portfolio of products to include
small molecule therapeutics, and is striving to become an integrated pharmaceutical company.
Table 3.3. Breakdown of revenue for Amgen, Inc. (Data Source: Evaluate Pharma)
Amgen Inc. (all financial data in US $,
Millions)
Since Amgen went public, a hallmark of the company's performance was the
exponential growth in annual revenue, primarily as a result of exploding sales of its blockbuster
Erythropoietin and Neulasta franchises.
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Fit. 3.2. Amgen Inc. world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales (1986 - 2011). (Data
Source: Amgen, Inc., Evaluate Pharma)
However, since 2005 Amgen's share price has stagnated. This was driven in large
measure by the systemic challenges faced by the industry, and the specific safety problems
faced by Amgen's EPO franchise. Further, since 2007, Amgen has faced a number of regulatory
setbacks related to the safety of its best-selling EPO franchise. The FDA review of the safety of
EPO and Aranesp (a related product) led to revised "black-box" safety labeling on these
products with a dramatic decline in the number of prescriptions written for these products.
The resulting decline in revenue sent Amgen share price sharply lower, and resulted in
significant shift in the overall R&D strategy of the company.
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Amgen: Annual World-Wide Sales (1986- 2011)
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Fig. 3.3. Amgen Inc. world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected growth
(2004 - 2018). (Data Source: Amgen, Inc., Evaluate Pharma)
More recently, Amgen has successfully launched a breakthrough biological product to
combat post-menopausal osteoporosis (PMO) in women, and to fight bone-metastasis in
patients suffering from certain forms of breast and prostate cancer. However, it is unlikely that
this biological product (branded as Prolia for the PMO indication, and Xgeva for the oncology
indication) will ever reach the forecasted combined peak annual sales of over $3 billion. The
development of this drug is an excellent example of the massive R&D investment and lengthy
development process, with over $1.5 billion and 14 years invested in developing the drug.
Amgen's days as a darling growth stock of the biotech industry are over, and for the first
time in its history Amgen declared a dividend in 2012 - yet another indication of slowing
growth.
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Astra Zeneca
AstraZeneca (AZ) is an Anglo-Swedish-American pharmaceutical company
headquartered in London. United Kingdom. The present form of this company is a result of
several mergers that occurred in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, when UK Based ICI
Pharmaceuticals, merged with Swedish Pharma company Astra to form AstraZeneca.
Table 3.4. Breakdown of revenue for AstraZeneca by business segment. (Data Source:
AstraZeneca, Evaluate Pharma)
AstraZeneca (all financial data in USS,21 208 CG
_Millions)V±1~ImEUIIi 0, E *I'hh6hpgftkmUpuu
Other Rx Sales 984 1,760 +9%
Alliance/ Co-promotion Revenue 211 1,254 +29%
Other Pharmaceuticals 484 407 -2%
Healthcare Sences 224 124 -8%
Eliminatlons/JV adjustment 
-335 -437 +4%
AstraZeneca invests nearly $4 billion in its R&D efforts every year. However, the return
on this R&D investment has been significantly lower for AstraZeneca in comparison to most of
its peers. Beginning in 2010, AstraZeneca has radically changed its R&D strategy and global
R&D footprint. Several R&D sites including S6dertalje (Sweden), Montreal (Canada), and
Wilmington (USA) were shut down, with over 4000 R&D related job losses. Of particular
significance is the fact that AstraZeneca has all but exited a core disease area - Neurosciences,
in which it has had significant presence for many decades. A much smaller "virtual"
neuroscience organization is now being formed, with most of the R&D being done by contract
research organization.
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AstraZeneca has a very aggressive partnering strategy, with a large number of global
partnerships with academia and emerging biotech companies. AstraZeneca's strategic
evolution has been driven largely by the fact that after a string of late stage failures in the clinic
due to safety/efficacy, or economic issues, the company could no longer justify the massive
expense of maintaining a relatively weak pipeline. Traditional markets in the West that could
support major block-busters like Nexium simply did not exist any longer, and better financial
performance meant that AstraZeneca needed to successfully enter emerging markets.
AstraZeneca: WW Prescription (Rx) Pharmaceutical Sales &
Percentage Sales Growth (2004-18)
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Fix. 3.4. AstraZeneca world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected growth
(2004 - 2018). (Data Source: AstraZeneca., Evaluate Pharma)
AstraZeneca, like most of its peer group is now engaged cutting costs and becoming
more efficient. Much of this reduction in cost is driven by major reductions in R&D
expenditure. In a recent report in the Financial Times (April 2012), the productivity of the R&D
efforts of several major European biopharmaceutical companies was reviewed. The study
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compared the total R&D expenditure of each company between 2007 and 2011, and
determined the NPV of new drug approvals in that same time period.
Between 2007 and 2011, AstraZeneca spent over $22.5 Billion in R&D and related areas.
In the same time period, AstraZeneca had three new drug approvals, with an estimated NPV of
$7.1 Billion. From a shareholders perspective, the cost per approved drug in this five-year
period is much too high. This is emblematic of the core problem of declining R&D productivity
in the face of increasing R&D expenditure. With the exception of Novartis, every company that
was part of the study had similarly disappointing results.
New drug
approvals
3
FINANCIAL TIMES
Fit. 3.5. Returns on R&D investment for AstraZeneca. A comparative study conducted by the
Financial Times, April 2012. (Source: Financial Times, April 2012).
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Eli Lilly & Company
Eli Lilly & Company (Lilly) is the 10 th largest biopharmaceutical company in the world,
and is headquartered in Indianapolis, USA. Lilly has remained independent over its 135-year
history, and has focused on several therapeutic areas including diabetes, cardiovascular
diseases, oncology, neurosciences, and urology.
Table 3.5. Breakdown of revenue for Eli Lilly & Co. by business segment. (Data Source: Eli Lilly
& Company, Evaluate Pharma).
Eli Lilly & Company (all financial data inm
US $, Millions)
Other Rx Sales 34 170 +26%
OTC 1,249 1,512 +3%
Royalty & Licensing Income 322 344 +1%
Total WW Pharmaceuticals 22,608 16,373 -5%
Agribusiness 1,679 3,064 +9%
T otal VYV Revenues 24,287 19,438
More recently, Lilly has added diseases of the emerging markets as a core area of R&D
focus. In 2011, Lilly spent over $5 Billion in R&D, with a significant portion of that being
directed to external partners. Lilly has been a leader in externalizing R&D, with substantial
efforts in China and India. Lilly's "Chorus" R&D model was designed to encourage lower-cost
partnerships in emerging markets that could provide a cost arbitrage, with the potential to
enhance the value of its R&D efforts.
43
CAGR 
I
43%
Regultwty Review
Select New Indication or Line Extension (NILEXI
Phase III
tupaMA *E en *N n r
-AW Ema~u NolBW ns ulin -ofV~a
,eed0" 3~o~ d~E=n *h o *
1-U, 0-a *Nctmrnal
A~tw*s qemNS
Enetui Rwmuunb
OLOCL SOW tuors
Howrvciance
M i7 reary name
3Lost through attrtion
OComnmercial
Collaboraton
NME
SeeNUX
Fig. 3.6.. Lilly's pipeline, Q1'12. (Source: Eli Lilly & Company)
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Percentage Sales Growth (2004-18):
22,000 25%
20,000 20%
18,000 15%I16,000h
14,00"5
5%A4,8,000
.0 60,00010
4,000 -15%
2,000 -20%
0 -25%
Prescription (Rx) Actual -U-Prescription (Rx) Growth
Fig. 3.7. Eli Lilly & Co.'s world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected growth
(2004 - 2018). (Data Source: Eli Lilly & Co., Evaluate Pharma)
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GlaxoSmithKline
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) is an Anglo-American biopharmaceutical company
headquartered in London, UK. Since 2008, GSK has focused on growing a diversified global
business with a presence in pharmaceuticals, consumer health, vaccines, and nutritional
products. GSK was formed through a series of mega-mergers in the 1990s' and early 2000s'.
Table 3.6. Breakdown of revenue for GlaxoSmithKline by business segment. (Data Source:
GlaxoSmithKline, Evaluate Pharma).
GlaxoSmithKline (all financial data in
US $, Millions)
Other Rx Sales 2,551 3,597 +5%
OTC 2,453 2,993 +3%
Royalty & Licensing Income 104 118 +2%
Consumer Healthcare 5,195 7,079 +5%
Total WW Revenues 27,387 36,696 +4/1
In the years immediately following the formation of GSK, the company underwent a
radical transformation in its R&D strategy. GSK was one of the earliest companies to recognize
that the productivity of its R&D investments was on the decline. Through a series of strategic
partnerships and alliances, GSK has built a diversified pipeline with an increased focus on
developing new drugs that can be brought to the market at a significantly lower cost. Despite
this, in the period between 2007 and 2011, GSK still had an overall negative NPV on its R&D
investments.
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Source: Deutsche Bank FINANCIAL TIMES
Fix .3.8. Returns on R&D investment for GlaxoSmithKline. A comparative study conducted by
the Financial Times, April 2012. (Source: Financial Times, April 2012).
GSK is one of the few global biopharmaceutical companies with a strong presence in the
development and marketing of vaccines for various illnesses that impact the emerging markets.
In 2011, GSK's R&D expenditures were approximately $4 Billion in pharmaceuticals, and $1
Billion in Vaccines. The global expansion of its pharmaceutical and vaccines franchises
combined with a rapidly growing presence in consumer healthcare is likely to put GSK in a
better position than many of its peer companies.
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Glaxo SmithKline: WW Prescription (Rx) Pharmaceutical Sales
& Percentage Sales Growth (2004-18)
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Fig. 3.9. Glaxo SmithKline's world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected
growth (2004 - 2018). (Data Source: GSK, Evaluate Pharma).
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Johnson & Johnson
Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) is a diversified healthcare company with a strong presence in
multiple market segments related to human health. J&J is headquartered in New Brunswick
(New Jersey), USA, and is the world's largest and most diverse medical devices and diagnostics
company, the world's eighth-largest pharmaceuticals company, and the world's fifth-largest
biologics company. Unlike most other companies in this sector, J&J is composed of over 250
operating companies in over 60 countries. In 2011, J&J's collection of pharmaceutical
companies invested over $5.1 billion in R&D to develop new medicines to treat serious and
widespread diseases, with a focus on multiple therapeutic areas including cardiovascular &
metabolism, immunology, infectious diseases & vaccines, neuroscience & pain, and oncology.
Table 3.7. Breakdown of revenue for Johnson & Johnson by business segment. (Data Source:
Johnson & Johnson, Evaluate Pharma).
Johnson & Johnson (all financial data is'21 08 CG
in US $,Millions)
Other Rx Sales 2,155 2,212 +0%
OTC 2,585 3,158 +3%
Royalty & Licensing Income 1,987 2,733 +5%
Consumer Healthcare 14,883 18,177 +3%
Balancing OTC -2,585 -3,158 +3%
Johnson & Johnson is perhaps the most diversified of all healthcare companies in the
world. The combined strength of J&J's prescription medicines business, and its medical
devices, diagnostics, and consumer healthcare businesses are likely to position J&J as one of the
leaders in the next decade. J&J's global brand recognition, diversified distribution channel, and
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supply chain expertise will be key strategic advantages as it expands its presence in emerging
markets.
Johnson & Johnson: WW Prescription (Rx) Pharmaceutical
Sales & Percentage Sales Growth (2004-18)
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Fig. 3.10. Johnson & Johnson's world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected
growth (2004 - 2018). (Data Source: Johnson & Johnson, Evaluate Pharma).
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Merck & Company
Merck & Co is an American pharmaceutical company and is headquartered in
Whitehouse Station, (New Jersey), USA. Once considered one of the most innovative and
progressive biopharmaceutical companies in the world, Merck went through what was perhaps
the most painful period in its long history during the mid-2000s' in the wake of the catastrophic
withdrawal of one of its best selling drugs, Vioxx. The story of Vioxx is as much about the issues
faced by the entire biopharmaceutical industry, as it is about Merck. Celebrated as a true
breakthrough in the treatment of pain, Vioxx offered hope to millions who suffered from
chronic pain. However, when previously unseen adverse events emerged in the patient
population at large, Vioxx was withdrawn voluntarily be Merck, leading to a prolonged period
of under-performance and costly legal issues for Merck. By 2009, Merck's once stellar R&D
organization was a shadow of its former self, with a pipeline that seemed to be amongst the
worst in the industry
Table 3.8. Breakdown of revenue for Merck & Co. by business segment. (Data Source: Merck &
Company, Evaluate Pharma).
Merck & Co. (all financial data in US $,
Millions)
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In 2009, Merck did what many other companies before it had done when faced with an
unproductive pipeline - they acquired Schering Plough, another ailing pharmaceutical company
that offered some potential synergies in the operations, and a small pipeline of drugs which
could bolster Merck's own pipeline. The combined company has embarked on a new strategy,
focusing on a smaller number of disease areas, enhancing its leading position in vaccines
development, and expanding its scope and operations into several emerging markets. Merck
invests over $4 billion in R&D annually, and has been working to improve its overall cost
structure. A number of R&D sites around the world have been closed, and more external
partnerships are planned.
Merck & Co.: WW Prescription (Rx) Pharmaceutical Sales &
Percentage Sales Growth (2004-18)
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Fie. 3.11. Merck & Co.'s world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected growth
(2004 - 2018). (Data Source: Merck & Co., Evaluate Pharma).
It is evident form Fig. 3.11. that Merck's revenue growth for the foreseeable future will
be weak. The 45% revenue spike in 2010 was the result of Merck's acquisition of Schering
Plough, and is unlikely to be repeated in the future.
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Novartis Pharmaceuticals
Novartis is a global biopharmaceutical company headquartered in Basel, Switzerland,
and was formed in 1996 as a result of a mega-merger between Ciba Giegy & Sandoz
Pharmaceuticals. Novartis has a strong culture of being an innovation driven pharmaceutical
company, and is foremost amongst its peers in aggressively managing the multiple challenges
faced by the industry. It is perhaps the best managed global biopharmaceutical company, and
is widely regarded as a formidable competitor.
Table 3.9. Breakdown of revenue for Novartis by business segment. (Data Source: Novartis,
Evaluate Pharma).
Novartis (all financial data in US$,
Millions)
Other Rx Sales 11,359 17,675 +7%
of which WW Unbranded Generics 8,574 11,719 +5%
Alliance/ Co-prmotion Reenue 15
Total WW Pharmaceuticals 51,726 57,458 +2%
Medical Devices & Healthcare Suppy' 6,448 10,241 +7%
Balancing OTC 
-3,327 -4,420 +4%
Total WW Kevenues 59,375 69,290
Novartis has a well-established strategy of becoming the leading innovator company in
each of its core disease areas which include oncology, metabolic diseases, immunology,
neurosciences, and vaccines. In addition, Novartis has established a leadership position in
several emerging markets including China and India. Further, through its Sandoz subsidiary,
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Novartis is also a dominant player in the global generics business, and has demonstrated that it
can effectively manage revenue losses due to patent expiry.
SoWe: Detsche Bar* FINANCIAL TIMES
Fig. 3.12. Returns on R&D investment for Novartis. A comparative study conducted by the
Financial Times, April 2012. (Source: Financial Times, April 2012).
The recent Financial Times study concluded that between 2007 and 2011, Novartis had
the most productive R&D strategy, with a significant positive NPV ($37.7 billion) with 15 new
drug approvals, and R&D expenditures of $28.7 billion. As stated earlier, Novartis's strategic
decision to grow its generics business will be a key factor in sustaining revenue in the future. In
my view, of the ten companies that I studied, Novartis is best positioned to reduce the impact
of patent expiry of its major drugs. In addition, Novartis's portfolio if current future drugs
appears to be more diversified by therapeutic class and peak revenue.
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Table 3.10. Novartis's top ten products by estimated revenue in 2018. (Data Source: Novartis).
10 Sandostatin LAR Pituitary & Hypothalamic 1443 911 4% -532 Marketed Mar2005
hormones
Total 36,199 34,205 -1% -1,994
Novartis: WW Prescription (Rx) Pharmaceutical Sales &
Percentage Sales Growth (2004-18)
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Fit. 3.13. Novartis's world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected growth
(2004 - 2018). (Data Source: Novartis, Evaluate Pharma).
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Product Therapeutic Subcategory Phase (Current) Pa11tent Epr
Pfizer Inc.
Pfizer is the world's largest biopharmaceutical company and is headquartered in New
York City, USA. Founded in 1849, Pfizer is a global leader in health with products that span the
entire range of human health. Pfizer has created two distinct research organizations - The
PharmaTherapeutics Research & Development group with a focus on discovering and
developing small molecule therapeutics, and The BioTherapeutics Research & Development
Group with a focus on large-molecule research, including vaccines.
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Fix. 3.14. A snapshot of Pfizer's drug development pipeline, Feb 2012. (Source: Pfizer)
Pfizer has had a history of engaging in major M&A activity and has acquired several
companies over the past 15 years, including Warner-Lambert, Pharmacia-Upjohn, and most
recently, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. This strategy was very successful in boosting Pfizer to the top
of the industry. Lipitor, the most successful pharmaceutical product ever, was brought into
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Pfizer's pipeline from its acquisition of Warner-Lambert. Until November 2011, when Lipitor
came off patent, it had reached annual global sales of nearly $10 billion.
Table 3.11. Breakdown of revenue for Pfizer by business segment. (Data Source: Pfizer,
Evaluate Pharma).
Pfizer (all financial data in US$,
Millions)
Other Rx 4,271 5,787 +4.4%
OTC 1,307 1,598 +2.9%
Royalty & Licensing Income 570 524 -1.2%
Total WW Pharmaceuticals 59,353 53,190 -1.6%
Agribusiness
Total WW Revenues
4,184 6,614 +6.8%
67,425 65,622
Pfizer, and many other companies have tried to reproduce the commercial success of
Lipitor, but have not succeeded. Importantly, the allure of developing and marketing a mega-
blockbuster drug like Lipitor led Pfizer and most other major pharmaceutical companies to
enter a period of unsustainable R&D expenditure. In its quest to develop and market multiple
blockbusters, Pfizer has faced a string of expensive late-stage failures, with several products
failing to meet FDA requirements in Phase 11 and Phase Ill, the most expensive stages of clinical
development. Pfizer's recent acquisition of Wyeth was meant to bolster its pipeline, and
provide a much needed revenue boost in the face of generic competition for Lipitor.
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Table 3.12. Pfizer's top ten products by estimated revenue in 2018. (Data Source:
Pfizer).
Rank PoductTherapeutic Subcategory
0 Lipitor Anti-hyperlipidaemics
8 Xalkori Other cytostatics 19 1,150 +80% +1,131 Mirketed Oct 2029
10 Norvasc Calcium antagonists 1,445 1,000 -5% 445 kketd Mar2007
Other 2 4 14,70 -% 7,87
Total 450,584 42,710 -2% -7,874
Pfizer: WW Prescription (Rx) Pharmaceutical Sales &
Percentage Sales Growth (2004-18)
60,000 30%
HI"' I
111mm
""INu-
Prescription (Rx) Actual -- Prescription (Rx) Growth
Fig. 3.15. Pfizer's world-wide prescription pharmaceuticals sales and projected growth (2004 -
2018). (Data Source: Pfizer, Evaluate Pharma).
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As shownin Fig. 3.15., Pfizer's acquisition of Wyeth in 2009 gave it a big boost in
revenue from that was seen in 2010. However, the loss of patent life (November 2011)
for Lipitor, the biggest-selling drug of all time with annual sales in excess of $10 billion is
expected to lead to a steep drop in revenue in 2012 and beyond. When we project
revunes in 2018, it is clear that the reliance on revenue growth from a a small number of
blockbusters can have a huge negative impact in the long run.
Pfizer: Patents - Sales Lost vs. Replacement (2008-18)
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Fig. 3.16. Pfizer's Patents: Sales lost Vs. replacement, 2008 - 2018 (Data Source: Pfizer,
Evaluate Pharma).
It is worth emphasizing again that the future does indeed look very challenging for
the world's largest pharmaceutical company. Pfizer's predicament might trigger another
round of major M&A activity. However if such M&A activity is driven by the business
model of the past decade, it is unlikely to succeed.
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Roche Holdings
Roche Holdings is a diversified global healthcare company headquartered in Basel,
Switzerland. Roche is the world's leading oncology company, and the world's number
one in vitro diagnostics company. With its combined strength in diagnostics and
pharmaceuticals, Roche aims to become the most effective company in personalized
medicine. In the face of the numerous challenges that the industry faces, Roche believes
that its strategy of developing drugs which are proven to be more efficacious and safe by
the use of appropriate diagnostics will lead to a reduction in the overall development
costs of new drugs.
Table 3.13. Breakdown of revenue for Roche by business segment. (Data Source: Roche,
Evaluate Pharma).
Roche (all financial data is in US $, Millions)
Total WW Revenues 42,531 54,609
In 2011, Roche invested nearly $8 billion in R&D, making it the leading R&D
investor in the biopharmaceuticals sector. In 2009, Roche completed its acquisition of
the outstanding shares of Genentech, a global biotechnology pioneer. This move marked
the end of a turbulent period for Roche - a period in which the productivity of its R&D
pipeline significantly below par. It is important to note that the figures presented in
Table 3.13 are for Roche's core Pharma business and do not include the revenues from
Roche's diagnostics business.
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Source: Deutsche Bank FINANC I T[MES
Fix. 3.17. Returns on R&D investment for Roche. A comparative study conducted by the
Financial Times, April 2012. (Source: Financial Times, April 2012)
As shown above, Roche has had a particularly unproductive period between 2007
and 2011, with only two new drug approvals, and a substantially negative return on its
R&D investments. Recent restructuring and cost cutting efforts may indicate that Roche
is becoming more effective at leveraging its R&D investments.
Another significant factor in determining Roche's future success will depend on
Roche's ability to diversify its revenue base. A significant portion of Roche's revenue -
expected to be over 65% in 2018 - is derived from its oncology and immunology
products. While effective, most of these products are priced beyond the reach of
patients in emerging markets. Roche's focus on oncology therapeutics is important in the
battle against cancer, but it is unclear if this strategy is sustainable.
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Roche: WW Rx & OTC Sales by Therapy Area in 2018
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Fig. 3.18. Roche's projected sales by therapeutic area in 2018. (Source: Evaluate
Pharma).
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Chapter 4
In the previous chapters, I reviewed the key challenges faced by the global
biopharmaceutical industry. I assessed the financial performance of the R&D investments
made by ten of the biggest and most influential global biopharmaceutical companies in light of
these challenges. In this chapter, I review the aftermath of the major changes in an industry
that is going through what is perhaps the biggest transformation in its entire history. Unlike
most other products and services that people consume, affordable healthcare and ready access
to medicines that can change the course of a person's life are not optional. The global
biopharmaceutical industry became one of the most profitable in the world, largely on the basis
of a stable and lucrative financial framework upon which it was built. Willing risk takers in
dynamic financial markets were able to underwrite very risky bets which paid off handsomely
on a few occasions.
As I have demonstrated, much of this has changed forever. The combined forces of
constrained markets, lower profitability due to restricted reimbursements, increased regulatory
scrutiny and uncertainty, and a significantly lower appetite for risk has changed the business
model of the biopharmaceutical industry.
This evolution brings with it new challenges and opportunities. Innovative business
models are being proposed and implemented. For the first time in history, a much larger
segment of the world's population is able to participate in making decisions that impact their
health. The increasing economic might of sizeable populations in emerging economies like
China and India is now a major factor in every decision that a global biopharmaceutical
company.
As we have seen, each of the ten companies that I studied has come to realize that the
age of the blockbuster drug is now over. Yet, shareholders of these companies still have
expectations of returns that are now highly unlikely. The recent financial performance of each
of the ten companies that I studied shows that profitability is on the decline. The entire
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industry is in the process of retreating from the massive investments that defined the
blockbuster era, with significant negative consequences for patients, shareholders, and
employees. Tens of thousands of people have lost their jobs, and this trend is likely to continue
for some time to come. The systemic impact of this phenomenon is likely to be felt for many
years to come.
There is little doubt that the industry is unlikely to go back to the blockbuster era, or
even create a financial encore in the post-blockbuster era. The real question is if the industry
can survive at all in its present form. There is little if any consensus about what comes next.
Each company has chosen a different strategic path as evidenced by the recent mergers,
acquisitions, and divestitures. Some like AstraZeneca and Merck have chosen to continue with
branded pharmaceuticals, hoping that the down cycle will eventually pass, and that by adding
new therapeutic areas or becoming better at using technology they can continue to generate
large profits from proprietary R&D that they own exclusively. Many others like Roche, Abbott,
Pfizer and Amgen are becoming more diversified, and have expanded into such sectors as
diagnostics, consumer health, generic drugs, biosimilars, nutrition, and wellness.
Industry experts agree on one thing - that there has never been a time in the industry
where a more divergent approach to the future has existed. In the next decade and beyond,
companies are unlikely to know what's going to happen. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly
certain that they can't know what is likely to happen, because most of the rules under which
they have operated for so long are changing in a fundamental way.
However, one thing is certain - none of the new areas of expansion that are open to the
biopharmaceutical industry offer the same margins as branded drugs. The already declining
levels of profitability of these companies are likely to continue, and those that cannot operate
efficiently under these new rules will not survive, or at the very least, will struggle to remain
independent. "Some will, some won't, because there won't be as big a proprietary market to
go around in the near term," says Miles D. White, the chief executive of Abbott Laboratories,
63
which is in the process of separating into two companies, one focused on diagnostics and
medical devices, the other on prescription drugs.
To survive - and perhaps thrive - in this unpredictable future, pharmaceutical
companies need to make some bets about the way the future of the industry will unfold, and
design their diversification strategies to position them for success in one or more of the
possible scenarios that might occur.
In my view, the industry needs to evolve to a point where a "portfolio of portfolios"
becomes the norm. Every aspect of a company's core strategy will need to be revisited, with a
portfolio approach to the very strategy of a given company. This trend has already started -
Joseph Jiminez, the CEO of Novartis recently stated that while Novartis is firm in its support of
innovation driven drug development capabilities and a strong intellectual property regime in
the pharmaceutical industry, it will also aggressively pursue a strong generics strategy which
will allow Novartis to rapidly take off-patent drugs from its own portfolio and that of other
companies and bring them to the generics market. With the scale, global reach, and the
formidable capabilities of Novartis's generics arm Sandoz, this dual strategy of pursuing novel
innovative drugs and generics simultaneously is a major shift in the industry. The recent
acquisition of a leading Turkish generics pharmaceutical company Mustafa Nevzat by Amgen is
another indication that this dual strategy might have significant merit. These strategic bets
which complement a companies' core capabilities are likely to be significant a source of
differentiation.
Companies will need to construct a portfolio of these "strategic bets" which span the
entire spectrum of their operations - from early discovery through product launch and
marketing. The benefits of diversification have been well established in the context of financial
markets. Most well diversified investors and investment portfolio managers rarely rely on a
single "tail event" - an event with an exceedingly low probability of success but with a
disproportionately high return. Instead, they construct a portfolio of holdings that are
constructed with a specific risk profile that is acceptable to the investors.
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The construction of a portfolio of strategic bets is not intuitive, and faces significant
opposition from the current cadre of senior executives in the biopharmaceutical industry, many
of whom believe that there will be a revival of the old model of blockbuster drugs discovered,
developed and marketed through big investments in the traditional R&D model. In this study, I
have attempted to present evidence that this is unlikely.
I recommend that the industry would be better off by building such a portfolio of
strategic bets by developing a set of adaptable business models which are optimized to provide
better health outcomes to patients, lower risk to shareholders and employees, and are more
likely to succeed in delivering new medicines in a more constrained and less predictable
regulatory environment.
Identifying Unknowns
As paradoxical as this might sound, biopharmaceutical companies can do a much better
job of assessing the unknowns that impact the industry. Much of the recent history of the
industry has been based on the assumption that the process of discovering, developing, and
marketing a new drug is a deterministic process. Collectively, the industry has followed a
process of conducting a limited set of "experiments" to accomplish this objective. To a first
order approximation, each of the ten companies I studied have followed the same strategy -
focusing on a few disease areas and working through the painstaking process of building a
proprietary pipeline of novel drugs, most of which would not make it to the market. In fact,
the cumulative risk-adjusted probability of any molecule being successfully launched as a
product is miniscule.
This is unsustainable in the future since many of the deterministic factors that I have
outlined earlier - IP protection, high reimbursement, high profit margins, a predictable if slow
regulatory path, and the relative patience of investors who viewed the biopharmaceutical
companies as safe investments, have all changed in a fundamental way. So just how uncertain
is this new era? Predicting how any one of these factors will evolve in the next decade is much
more difficult, and the probability of being able to accurately predict the evolution and
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interdependence of all of these factors is nearly impossible. The industry has moved from a
deterministic era to a stochastic era, where most of the factors that will determine the success
of the industry are inherently unpredictable.
This is not unique to the biopharmaceutical industry. Most industries go through
periods of both deterministic and stochastic development. In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the
prominent companies in the computer industry - IBM, Burroughs, Cray, and Digital Equipment
Corporation - all followed a fairly well characterized, deterministic path. All these companies
also followed similar strategies focused on mainframe computers. The advent of the personal
computer changed the industry forever, and brought a swift end to the mainframe era.
Burroughs, Cray, and DEC disappeared quickly, and IBM almost disappeared. It was the bold
strategic shift embraced by Lou Gerstner that rescued IBM. Today, IBM is nothing like the
company it was just twenty years ago. It follows a fundamentally different business model, and
has created an enviable portfolio of strategic bets - a portfolio of portfolios - and has become
incredibly good at executing on these strategic bets, enhancing those that work, and rapidly
shedding those that do not work.
In this new, stochastic era of the biopharmaceutical industry each of the ten companies
that I studied have very have divergent views of how the future will evolve. One measure of
this is the fact that while there was massive consolidation through mergers and acquisitions,
the M&A activity followed no clear pattern. Much of it was driven by a need to replace rapidly
dwindling revenue streams brought upon by patent expirations, as in the case of Pfizer. Others,
such as Merck acquired companies to bolster weak pipelines with the hope of succeeding under
the old model of drug development.
Mergers and R&D alliances have been part of the life-sciences industry for a very long
time. Since the mid-1990's, and particularly since the early 2000's, very large mergers between
global pharmaceutical companies became much more commonplace. Almost every
biopharmaceutical company that I studied is a product of one or more mergers - GSK, Novartis,
Roche, Pfizer, Sanofi, Astra-Zeneca, etc. During the same period, R&D alliances were more
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prevalent between large companies and small, targeted biotech companies and academia.
Most of these R&D alliances were opportunistic rather than strategic, and were often driven by
specific interests in a molecule, gene, pathway, or disease indication.
At an industry level, much of the M&A activity is viewed as not having succeeded in
meeting the primary stated objective - improvement in R&D productivity and the efficiency and
impact of the pipeline. An inevitable conclusion that can be derived from this is that M&A
activity is an ineffective method of augmenting and de-risking a pipeline. This is supported by
recent evidence, and is consistent with the views expressed by leading experts in the industry,
including Mr. Ray Gilmartin who was the Chairman & CEO of Merck & Company until recently.
One area where M&A activity seems to hold promise is in biologics. Most of the
companies I studied have rapidly built capabilities in biologics (also known as large molecule
drugs), primarily through targeted acquisitions. Due to the higher barrier to entry, lower threat
from biosimilars, and a relatively stable reimbursement horizon, biologics offer much needed
diversification, and have become an important component in the portfolio of strategic bets of
each of the companies I studied.
Another important element in this diversified portfolio of strategic bets is M&A activity
directed at market expansion and internationalization, reducing the cost of logistics,
operations, manufacturing, and in attaining a better bargaining position with increasingly
powerful payers.
R&D alliances, on the other hand can have substantial positive impact on R&D
productivity. In my view, a diverse portfolio of globally sourced R&D alliances can be an
effective strategic bet for a fraction of the costs associated with M&A activity. These alliances
often provide a diversity of thought and ideas, and perhaps most importantly, can align the
incentives of the internal R&D staff and the alliance partners around achieving quantifiable
success in a defined time period.
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The Value of Strategic Bets
These attempts at diversification - M&A, R&D alliances etc. - are unlikely to solve the
core problems of the biopharmaceutical industry. Although it might appear that these
strategies are designed to position a company for success in one or more of the business
scenarios that are likely to occur, most management teams are unable to predict with any
degree of certainty as to which specific business scenario is more likely to occur - there are too
many unknowns. Even those companies that have systematically acquired capabilities that
seem to hedge against one or more of the unknowns face an uncertain future.
Most of the companies that I studied appear to be adding new businesses primarily to
expand their portfolios and reduce the volatility of revenue and earnings. In an industry
defined by long product development cycles and extreme costs, focusing on quarterly earnings
and near-term revenue growth is no longer sufficient. For example, J&J has built a portfolio of
healthcare companies, many of which were acquired in the last decade. The view of the top
management team at J&J is that each of these portfolio companies must survive and become
profitable independently.
Choosing R&D financig and patnership models
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Fig. 4.1. A Capacity Vs. Capital model for selecting a portfolio of strategic bets in the
biopharmaceutical industry. (Source: Eric David et al, McKinsey & Company)
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This mind-set of building a diverse portfolio of related companies as in the case of J&J, is
fairly common in the biopharmaceutical industry. The underlying assumption is that these
quasi-independent companies should be managed separately, and their individual profits
maximized. While this strategy might have made good sense in a deterministic environment,
recent evidence suggests that it is less likely to succeed in a stochastic environment. These
businesses are inherently correlated and are exposed to many of the risk factors I have
described previously. In a healthcare environment defined by unknowns in which no company
can realistically predict how the future will evolve, this approach of building a portfolio of
stand-alone companies is insufficient.
The announcement by Abbott Labs to separate into two independent, publically traded
companies signals the industry's acceptance of this fact. By splitting into two companies - a
medical products company, and a research-based biopharmaceutical company - Abbott is
shielding the less profitable but more predictable medical products business from the more
risky research-based pharmaceuticals business. This is good for Abbott's shareholders - they
will realize the value created by Abbott's integrated strategy of the past, but are free to decide
if they wish to participate in the stochastic future of Abbott's pharmaceutical business.
This approach of building a portfolio of strategic bets may provide the companies that I
studied with greater flexibility in adapting their market positions, operating models,
geographical footprint, and regulatory exposure. In an increasingly stochastic environment, the
ability to rapidly reallocate scarce resources in order to maximize value and minimize risk will
prove to be an important differentiator.
Some companies like Novartis have already made significant progress in this direction.
Most notably, Novartis's relentless drive to build a portfolio of products that can weather the
current environment is a remarkable achievement. For example, even at over $6 billion in
annual revenue, Novartis's best-selling anti-hypertensive drug Diovan only makes up about 12%
of its overall revenue. Thus, when this product comes off patent in 2012, the revenue shock to
Novartis will be less significant than that faced by other companies. Even more remarkable is
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the fact that in the case of Diovan, Novartis has a credible plan to retain over 50% of the
revenue after patent expiry - nearly $3 billion in perpetuity - by expanding the market for
Diovan into the increasingly lucrative Chinese and Indian markets. Novartis will also remain in
firm control of the global supply of Diovan by ensuring that most of the manufacturing of
generic Diovan is done by Novartis's generics arm, Sandoz.
In the previous chapter, I showed that Novartis was the only company amongst its peers
to have a positive NPV on its R&D investments between 2007 and 2011. This was primarily due
to its ability to place multiple strategic bets - cost reduction, expansion into generics, emerging
markets, biologics, biosimilars, stratified medicine, and most notably - a shift away from the
blockbuster paradigm. The diverse portfolio of drugs that are in Novartis's current pipeline
address a range of unmet medical needs in developed and emerging markets, with many of
these potential drugs likely to have peak sales of well under $1 billion.
Typical venture capita 2
Typical pharrna3
Novartis
Novartis's venture funds double pipeline exposure
M PrecLc c us Phase 1 M Phase 2 U Phase 3 N Registered
b 44 | 6124 2 206
45 154
2 242
f- Novartis venture funds (112) | Novartis internal pipeline (130) -
Based on estimated completeness of sources. The issue is that some of the preclinical data is not completely reliable.2Average of 3 of the most active pharma venture funds.
3Average of 3 of the top pharma companies, by revenues.
Source: Capital IQ; EvaluatePharma database; Novartis Venture Fund 2o5 Activity Report; portfolio company Web sites
Fie. 4.2. Novartis's approach to building a diversified pipeline.
Another hypothesis that is gaining momentum is that in the near future, disease
management will have less to do with prescription drugs and physician intervention, and will
increasingly become the responsibility of the patients. In this scenario, companies are likely to
enhance their portfolio of options by expanding into the consumer healthcare business. If this
scenario gains traction, the company will already have the platform in place to make its overall
business more successful by successfully combining pharmaceuticals with consumer health. If
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however, this scenario does not gain traction in a reasonable time period, the company making
the strategic bet can alter its treatment of the unit by managing it for profit or selling it off.
Another likely scenario is that diagnostics will become essential in ensuring the success
of most drugs in the future by identifying patients who are most likely to benefit from a
particular drug. In a world where an increasing number of reimbursement decisions are based
on the effectiveness of a drug, the ability to find and treat patients who can truly benefit form a
drug will offer an important competitive advantage. The combination of proprietary
diagnostics and effective drugs is likely to improve the effectiveness of the R&D investments of
these companies and will contribute significantly to improved profitability.
The construction of an effective portfolio of strategic bets should become the highest
priority of the senior management of biopharmaceutical companies. In my view, this effort
should be led by the CEO, and should include the top management team of a company. It is
likely that in almost all cases, this process will change the strategic direction of the company.
The compensation packages of the CEO and the top management team of these companies
must primarily be based on the contextual validity of such a portfolio of strategic bets in an
increasingly stochastic environment, and less on quarterly earnings and near-term financial
performance of these companies.
In a recent study on CEO compensation, McKinsey & Company concluded that long-term
value creation should become a major component of guiding CEO compensation. This is
increasingly true for the biopharmaceutical industry, where a key measure of performance is
the recognition that long-term value creation is a function of returns on capital, sustainable
growth, and predictable cash flows. However, establishing a performance-based compensation
system for the CEOs and other senior executives in a biopharmaceutical company is not an easy
task. The special skills required to navigate an inherently long-cycle industry through a
turbulent period defined by unknown risks are not easy to find and retain.
To date, most companies continue to reward CEOs and the senior management team
for short-term total returns to shareholders. Short-term returns are driven more by systemic
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changes in the industry and movements in the broader market than by individual performance.
Thus, stock-option based compensation for senior executives in publically traded
biopharmaceutical companies might be inappropriate in the stochastic era that is now the
reality for this industry. Instead, a compensation system based on sustainable growth by
successfully executing on strategic bets, returns on investments (R&D in particular), and
performance relative to peers is likely to be more impactful.
CEO compensation in the biopharmaceutical industry has come under greater scrutiny
in recent years, largely due to the fact that some of the core principles of finance have been
ignored by the industry. Sustainable value creation in a stochastic environment is incredibly
hard, and employing the techniques that have succeeded in past, or in other industries is not
likely to be successful. It is not surprising that the spate of M&A activity, share buy-backs,
reductions in staffing, externalization of R&D and other operations to take advantage of cost
arbitrage, etc. have not succeeded. In the book "Value: The Four Cornerstones of Corporate
Finance", Richard Dobbs and his co-authors argue that creation of long-term value for
shareholders and society at large can only be accomplished by a more thoughtful application of
the basic principles.
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in practice:
Eva..atg projects
A company shouldn't pass up potentially
high-return projects just because they have
moderate downside risk.
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in practice:
erend aes i.
Be wary of mergers that are justified (or
vetoed) on the basis of their impact
on earnings per share. Earnings per share
(EPS) has nothing to say about how
merging two entities will change the cash
flows they generate.
.onedm -
ef-emisse primeigdeo
You can't create
wa by re umg
ciim. on cash flows.
Valu creation
treadmlU princsipe: p
The muo imestors ex-
pect of your salre pre,
the beer you must
perforn to Mep up.
In practice:
Exeestive apnain
Emphasize long-term growth and returns
on capital inprovements, measure
perfo.nance against market expectations,
and index compensation to the market
performance of peer companies.
A businass's vus
depends upon its
owner's capablities.
In practice:
Div notitre
A multibusiness comnpanry should
regularly hold business-exit reviews and
place a date stamp on divisions, with
a milestone for assessing whether it is
still the best owner.
Fie. 4.3. The Four Cornerstones of Corporate Finance. (Source: "Value: The Four
Cornerstones of Corporate Finance" by Richard Hobbs, Bill Huyett, and Tom Koller (Wiley,
October 2010)
Conclusions & Recommendations
Much of this work has been focused on understanding the drivers for the poor
outcomes for R&D investments in the biopharmaceutical industry. With few exceptions, each
of the ten companies that I studied has faced the same set of challenges in transitioning form a
deterministic environment to a stochastic environment. Changes in reimbursement, the
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evolution of the regulatory landscape, and the passing of the blockbuster era have led to
increasing uncertainty for the biopharmaceutical industry. One approach to improving the
performance of the industry is based on the application of a "portfolio of portfolios"
methodology to the discovery and development of medically relevant and financially successful
drugs.
Even as we consider a portfolio based approach, it is important to recognize that several
unknown and unquantifiable risks remain. Companies that are most likely to succeed in the
future will be those that can successfully fine-tune the risk-reward profile within segments of a
portfolio - a portfolio of diseases from oncology to rare diseases, a portfolio of projects in the
pipeline, a portfolio of strategic bets, or a portfolio of companies - with the ultimate goal of
responding nimbly to market opportunities or perceived price-value gaps. However, it is
important to recognize that while these efforts can help streamline a company by better
allocation of capital and resources, R&D productivity will only be enhanced if they can
consistently deliver additional successful programs at lower cost and reduced risk.
The application of portfolio theory to reducing the risk and improving the productivity of
R&D investments whether in the private sector, or in government funded research has
significant merit. This approach would lead to greater transparency, improved objectivity, and
better and more reproducible outcomes from the extraordinary R&D investments made by the
biopharmaceutical industry. Ultimately, a "portfolio of portfolios" would also have to consider
the societal implications of developing drugs for not just mainstream diseases that impact
millions of people in the developed and emerging markets, but also rare diseases that impact
small numbers of patients. If successfully applied, an efficient "portfolio of portfolios" would
not only provide substantial returns to shareholders, but would also improve the lives of
patients everywhere. My work suggests that the following five principles are likely to define
the biopharmaceutical industry in the next decade and beyond.
Changes in the industry are inevitable and permanent: The era of the blockbuster model and
the reliance on proprietary, internally developed R&D capabilities are at an end. Companies
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that accept this reality at the highest levels of management, and consider adopting a portfolio
of strategic bets are likely to emerge stronger in the next decade.
Consider a range of future scenarios and accept the fact that many unknowns remain:
Although we are entering a stochastic period in the biopharmaceutical industry, it does not
mean that every outcome is equally possible. A continuous evaluation of the possible
outcomes and proactive engagement with payers, regulators, potential partners, and investors
can help companies develop options on how they would respond to any given scenario.
Assess the inherent capabilities of the company: Identifying and enhancing the core
capabilities that differentiate a company is particularly important during a period of big change.
It is unlikely that many of the capabilities that made the companies I studied successful in the
past are likely to be factors in their future success. For example, while Novartis is well
underway in executing on many of the strategic bets that are likely to have a positive impact in
the future, many of the other companies such as Merck & Company and AstraZeneca are just
beginning this process.
Identify those strategic bets that can enhance a company's leadership position: Traditional
biopharmaceutical companies such as AstraZeneca or Amgen are unlikely to transform into a
diagnostics leader in a reasonable time. Established leaders such as Roche and J&J are likely
strengthen their leadership position in diagnostics. However, AstraZeneca and Amgen can
create strategic partnerships with diagnostics companies as part of a "portfolio of partners".
The same logic applies to adding a generics capability, where a company like Novartis is a
dominant player. Pfizer's strategic investment in strengthening its generics arm, Greenstone is
an indication of Pfizer's intent to execute on a strategic bet in generics.
Align the corporation at every level to execute effectively on strategic bets: From the CEO and
senior management team to the R&D scientist in the lab, ensure that there is a clear alignment
with the concept of a portfolio of portfolios. The success of any strategic bet will depend
largely on speedy and effective execution. This is particularly true in R&D, where even small
changes in direction take years to implement.
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Companies that succeed in the future will recognize that while this stochastic period
might last for the foreseeable future, stability will eventually return. While some unknowns
might persist, there is likely to be more harmonization and predictability in the regulatory
landscape. Reimbursement strategies and the impact of payers are also evolving, and while it is
clear that industry will not be as profitable as it once was, revenue streams are likely to
become more predictable. The emergence of countries like China and India as leading
consumers of healthcare will also change the revenue horizon in a positive direction.
Each of the ten companies I studied has a very different approach on how to navigate
the turbulent times that face the industry. This portfolio of strategies offers an opportunity for
the industry to experiment with their own set of strategic bets, strengthening those that work
and rapidly abandoning those that do not.
Suggestions for future work
In this study I have taken a qualitative approach to assessing the paradox of declining
R&D productivity in the face of massive R&D investments by the industry, particularly in the last
decade. Each of the ten companies I studied has faced major challenges, and only one -
Novartis - has bucked this trend of lower R&D productivity. Novartis was early to recognize the
fundamental shifts in the industry, and implemented a portfolio approach to not just its R&D
pipeline, but to a series of strategic bets that it continues to refine. I propose that future work
should be aimed at understanding the evolving landscape from three related yet distinct
perspectives:
e A formal, quantitative approach to assessing the risk to reward ratio of a selected set of
well-defined strategic bets. Drawing from established principles in finance theory, such
a study would attempt to quantify the magnitude and duration of a set of investments
in R&D and related areas in the face of unknown and unquantifiable risks.
" A quantitative assessment of the impact of a diversified portfolio of strategic bets on the
financial performance of companies. For instance, would an Innovative Pharma +
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Diagnostics company provide better returns to shareholders than an Innovative Pharma
+ generics company? What would the impact of rare diseases and orphan drugs be on a
Pharma company that has focused primarily on mainstream diseases? What is the
quantifiable impact of a reimbursement model that is not based on the single-payer or
third-party payer system?
e A quantitative approach to developing a model for constructing a "portfolio of
portfolios" - R&D pipelines, investment choices (venture capital, private equity, disease
specific funds, pipeline insurance), disease areas (therapeutic area, mainstream diseases
Vs. rare diseases), manufacturing capacity, regulatory risk, etc.
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Appendix A
NOTE: Allfinancial data in this Appendix was obtained from the company specific "S&P
Compustat Company Report".
Selected Financial Data: Abbott Laboratories
Fij. A.1. Abbott Laboratories (ABT) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price
(2004 - 2012).
Table A.1. Abbott Laboratories key financial data (2004 - 2012).
Fidametals
Price/Earnings
Price/Sales
Price/Book Value
Price/Cash Flow
Gross Margin
Profit Margin
Sales/Employee
Income/Employee
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
PEG (Historical Growth)
Beta
Annual Dividend
Dividend Yield
2004 2005 2006 2007 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012
Z7x
16.1%
$324.8 Th
52 Th
222%
11.0%
0.911
0.2
$1.04
2.2%
18.3x 43.x
2.7x 3.x
4.2x 5.3x
12x 22.9X
59.6% W.5%
15.1% 7.%$373.1 Th S337.2 Th
356.5Th IQ*Th
23.4% 122%
11.6% 4.7%
2.7x -1x
02 .4
$1.11 S1.18
2.8% 24%
AN values in the Fundmentals table are calculated using fiscal year data unless otherwise noted
24.3x
3.4x
4.9x
15.9x
65.1%
13.9%
$381.1 Th
53.0 Th
20.3%
9.1%
5.3x
0.3$1.30
2.3%
17.5X
2.8x
4.7x
12.K
64.7%
1&0%
$W2.9 Th
*4.6 Th
21.1%
11.2%
1.5X
0.2
$1A4
26%
14.6x
2.7x
17x
10.7x
64.8%
18.7%
$421.4Th
S78.7 Th
25.1%
11.0%
0.3x
0.2
$1.60
2.9%
2.1x
3KU
10.2x
67.6%
13.2%
.7 Th
51.4 Th
211.7%
1.9X
0.3
$1.77
3.8%
18.7x
2.3x
3.6X
11.4x
68.7%
12.2%
$426.9 Th
52.0 Th
19.3%
7.8%
-84.7x
0.3
$1.92
3.3%
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Peer ompaso. RtiosAN values are forthe Ist fscal wer unless ritewisem notedCompany Name ficker Symbol) P/E (4/26/12) High P/E Low P/E PEG Ratio PrIce DEastegs
Abbs abwaores (ART) - *192 *114 '144 *-03
Sanofi (SNY) 13.4 14.5 11.0 1.2
Glaxosmithkine PLC (GSK) 14.4 14 12.1 1.9
Merck & Co Inc. (MRK) 10.0 14 145 -1.0
Novo Nordisk A/S (NVO) 28.8 2I 180 1.0
Roche Holding AS (RHHBY) NA NA NA 2.1
High and Low PI are for traming twetve months using diuted EPS exckudig extraordinary mias. PEG reio Is historical.
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Line charts below give a 5 year history for ABT and up to 5 peers.
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Fig. A.2. Abbott Laboratories company performance in comparison to its industry segment
(2004 - 2012).
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Fig. A.3. Management effectiveness of Abbott Laboratories in comparison to selected peers in
its industry segment.
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Selected Financial Data: Amgen, Inc.
Fig. A.4. Amgen (AMGN) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price (2004 -
2012).
Table A.2. Amgen's key financial data (2004 - 2012).
F-ndasmentels
Price/Earnings
Price/Sales
Price/Book Value
Price/Cash Flow
Gross Margin
Profit Margin
Sales/Employee
Income/Employee
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
PEG (Historical Growth)
Beta
Annual Dividend
Dividend Yield
04 2005 2006 2007 2006 2W0 2010 2011 2012
3,4x 26.9x 27.5x 1I.5x 1M 12.K 11.K 159x
7.7x 7.8x ix 34X 4& 3.& 3,x 33
4.1x 4.7x 42x 2.8x 3,X 2.5x 2Ix 2.7x
*Ix 21.4x X 11.6x 11.x 10 W.1x 1I0.x
PA% 87.6% 0L6% 9D.7% 90.5% 90.9% K1% 89.8%
22A% 29.6% 27% 21.4% U0% 31.5% *7% 23.6%
*32,6 Th S53. Th US.Th 844.1 Th IW7A Th 0851.3 Th .18 Th 8754 Th
S1R1 Th 222.7 Th $14L$ Th $10,9Th 2. Th 1267.7 Th *1,9 Th 2&9 Th
12.0% 18.0% 1L% 17.7% 2U% 20.3% 182% 19A%
1.1% 12.5% .7% 9.1% 11.9% 11.6% 1#6% 7.5%
.7x 0M Si 1.0 1.K 0.6K IAK 13,4x 
1,5 0.8 .7 1.1 .4 0.5 0.4
*MOO 00.00 8 $180 .00 04 *m 899
0.0% 0.0% 1.% 0.0% 00% 0% 10% 0.9%
All values Inthe Fmdamentals table are calculated using fiscal year data unless othenwise noted
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Al values are forthe
Company Name (Twicker Symbol) P/E (4/2i112) High PIE Low P/E PEG Ratio
Amgen in. (AMCN) - *16.4 *15 *11.1 *3A
Gilead Sciences Inc (GILD) 15.9 17.1 10.4 16
Colgene Corp (CELS) - 22.7 R 16.1 -. 8
Biogen Idec Inc (B1IB) 26.0 210 16.7 1U
Alexion Pharmaceuticals Inc (ALXN) 89A 910 43.8 1
Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc (REGN) -56.8 U4 -17.6 47
High and Low PE are for trailing twelve months using diluted EPS excuding extraordlinary items. PEG ratio Is historical
Valuamon
last fscal year unless otherwise noted.
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Fig. A.5. Amgen: company performance in comparison to its industry segment (2004 - 2012).
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Fig. A.6. Management effectiveness of Amgen in comparison to selected peers in its industry
segment.
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Selected Financial Data: Astra Zeneca
Fit. A.7. AstraZeneca (AZN) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price (2004 -
2012).
Table A.3. AstraZeneca's key financial data (2004 - 2012).
Fumdamentals 2004 2005 2004 2007 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012
Price/Earnings 16&K 16.7x 119x 11.SX ab 9.0k Ux 6.3x -
Price/Sales 2ze 3.2x 1X 2.Lx .k 2.1x 1.k 1.7x
Price/Book Value 42x 5.7x SAx 42x 17x 3.x 2k 2.x
Price/Cash Row 11.9 12.9x 11.2x 8 7.K 7Ax IL 5K -
Gross Margin 2.0% 82.1% SL1% 85.6% US.% 88.1% V1.2% 881% -
Profit Margin 17.5% 19.5% 22A% 18.5% 149% 22.7% 217% 29.0% -
Sales/Employee $336 Th 369.7 Th $02Th $449.1 Th $45.Th $519.4 Th 5 7 Th $574,7 Th
Income/Employee *514Th 872.1 Th ESITh 83.0 Th RO Th $117.7 Th 315 Th $166.9 Th
Return on Equity RA% 346% 3.5% 37.9% 313% 364% 37% 42.9% -
Return on Assets 14% 18.9% P.2% 11.7% 13,% 13.7% UR3% 18.9%
PEG (Historical Growth) l.ii 08X 0.x a.k a, 0.1X Rb 0.3x -
Beta a5 OA 0.7 0.6 0A 0.7 A 0.6
Annual Dividend 95 $1.A0 $1A5 $1.82 $1.91 82.09 2A 82.90
Dividend Yield 2.3% 2.1% 2.% 4.1% 4.% 4.5% ,2% 5.8% -
Al values in the Fundametals table are caiculated using fiscal year data unless otherwise noted
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Peer Comparison Ratios All values are for thehtlna a ils tews ntd
Company Name fTicker Symbol) P/E (4127/12) High P/E Low P/E PEG Ratio PriesfEemp
Astranesca PLC (AZN) - U . 5.6 U
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co (BMY) 15.0 10 11.6 1.5
Bayer AG IBAYRY) 18.5 22.7 12.6 2.1
EliLilly and Co ILLY) 10.7 Ii V. ,4
Novo Nordisk A/S (NVO) 26.8 23 17.5 1.0
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd (TEVA) 14.8 16. 11.4 I,2
High and Low P/E are for traling twive months using diluted EPS excudng extraeordiry iaer. PEG rato Is historicaL
Valasiam
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Line charts below give a 5 year histry for AZN and up to 5 peers.
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Fig. A.8. AstraZeneca: company performance in comparison to its industry segment (2004 -
2012).
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Fi. A.9. Management effectiveness of AstraZeneca in comparison to selected peers in its
industry segment.
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Selected Financial Data: Eli Lilly & Company
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Fia. A.10. Eli Lilly (LLY) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price (2004 - 2012).
Table A.4. Eli Lilly's key financial data (2004 - 2012).
Fwdeamenteas 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2009 2010 2011 2012
Price/Earnings
Price/Sales
Price/Book Value
Price/Cash Flow
Gross Margin
Profit Margin
Sales/Employee
Income/Employee
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
PEG (Historical Growth)
Beta
Annual Dividend
Dividend Yield
34.2x 30.9K
45x 4.2x
7x 5.7x
29 23.9x
R3% 80.2%
13.1% 13,7%$311.4Th 343 Th
I7 Th $47.0Th
1.% 18.5%
73% 8.1%
-2.K -31X
1,4 0.7
1.A2 $1.54
25% 2.7%
All values In the Fundamentals table are calculated using fiscal year data unless othmwnse noted
21.3
3.6x
6.2x
17.3x
17.0%
71 Th
N4.2Th
1M
21%
19.7x
3.1x
43X
15.3x
81.%
15.8%
$450 Th
$72.7Th
21.9%
11.0%
1.1x
0.9
$1.74
3.2%
-21.2x
six
-315x
.3%
-10,2%
AmR Th
-$61.2 Th-a$%
-7.1%
-1&,7x
.7
$1.90
43%
9.1x
1.8x
4.1x
7.2x
85.5%
1.8%
3541.0 Th
$107.3 Th
45.5%
15.8%
0.5X
0.8
$1s
5.5%
7.7x
2lx
lx
U.0%
M0.7Th
$112 Th
31.'7
018%
10.7x
1.9x
3Mx
Ux
84.1%
17.9%
837.8 Th
$114,2 Th
32.1%
12.9%
.4x
0.7
51.97
4.7%
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Peer Comparison Railos AN values are for the last fiscal year unless otherwise noted.
Company Name (Ticker Symbol) P/E (4/3/12) igh P/E Low P/E PEG Ratio PIeitoEwmp
Ei Ully and Ce (LLY) - *7 aggg *gy * *
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd (TEVAI 14.9 16.8 1.A 2 #
Astrazeneca PLC (AZN) -el- . 5.6 3
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co (BMY) 15.0 160 11.6 1.5 A
Bayer AG (BAYRY) 16.2 22.5 12.6 2,1
Novo Nordisk A/S (NVO) 27.3 28,3 17.5 . .1a.0 M "1 M 1I11
High and Low P/E are for traing twelve monttis using diuted EPS exckiding extraordinary teims. PEG ratio IslNstoricaL
Line charts below give a 5 year history for LLY and up to 5 peers.
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Fij. A.11. Eli Lilly: company performance in comparison to its industry segment (2004 - 2012).
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Fia. A.12. Management effectiveness of Eli Lilly in comparison to selected peers in its industry
segment.
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Selected Financial Data: GlaxoSmithKline
Fia. A.13. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price (2004
- 2012).
Table A.5. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) key financial data (2004 - 2012).
Fedmentals 2004 2005 2006 2007 2013 2000 2010 2011 2012
Price/Earnings 1615 17 14,x 13k 14k 12.1X 31k 14x --
Price/Sales K 3k 3.2x 2 ,k 2m 23x 26x -
Price/Book Value 11.9K 11O 7.2x 7.lx Ix 6.6 7A 9.ix -
Price/Cash Flow 12K 142 1iX 10K I.ix 9.3x 2m 10k -
Gross Margin 83,3% 82.5% 82.6% 82.0% 11.7% 81.0% 0.2% 79.2% -
Profit Margin 21.0% 21.3% 2.9% 22.5% 18.% 19.0% U7% 188% -
Sales/Employee SMTh 38. Th $452.7 Th 8445.0Th 86Th $471.3 Th NliR9Th 8446.7Th -
Income/Employee 2.Th 881. ATh $103.7 Th 510L1 Th U.Th $895 Th $11 Tb =819 Th
Return on Equity 72.% 61.9% R9% 54.3% R % 55.3% I4% 65.5% -
Return on Assets 19.1% 17.2% 21.1% 16.8% 11.7% 12.9% 19% 12.8% -
PEG (Historical Growth) II 1k 1Ax 1.x5K 4k -.6K -1.Ix l. -
Beta 02 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 6 0.6 -
Annual Dividend $1.62 $1.52 $18 82.15 1.71 1.97 $18 82.36 -
Dividend Yield 3.4% 3.0% 3.3% 4.1% 5.7% 4.4% 1% 4.8%
All values In the Fundamentals table are calculated using fiscal year data unless othendse noted
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PeerCempnsen RaiosAN values are for the lost fiscal wear unless otherwise notedCompany Name (Ticker Symbol) P/E (4/3012) High P/E Low P/E PEG Rato Pde a Emg
GlaxosmWbkN PLC (GSK) 14.9 1&3 125 1,9
Merck & Co Inc. (MRK) 17.4 17.5 111 .1.0
Roche Holding AG (RHIHBY) NA NA NA 21
Sanofi(SNY) 12.5 1. 10.1 1.2
Novartis AG (NVS) 15.5 11 145 7.5
Abbott Laboratories (ABT) 19.3 114 144 -47 n- =,HK19 and Low PIE are for traling twelve monhs using diluted EPS excluding extraordinary tems. PEG rao Is historical
I 20i2v1
Line charts below give a 5 year history for GSK and up to 5 peers.
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FiR. A.14. GlaxoSmithKline: company performance in comparison to its industry segment (2004
-2012).
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Fig. A.15. Management effectiveness of GlaxoSmithKline in comparison to selected peers in its
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Selected Financial Data: Johnson & Johnson
Fi. A.16. Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price
(2004 - 2012).
Table A.6. Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) key financial data (2004 - 2012).
Fundamentls 2004 2005 200M 2007 2006 2000 2010 2011 2012
Price/Earnings 22.3 17Ax 17.x ISAx 1Ix 14.6x 121 18.&
Price/Sales 3.5x 3X 3.1x 20c 2.x 2.7x
Price/Book Value ,9 .x 741 44x UK1 3.5x 3)1 1ix
Price/Cash Row 17.7x 14.3x 14Ax 14.2x 10k 111 1AK 13.9X
Gross Margin R1% 76.5% 7M% 75.5% 76% 749% 742% 73.7%
Profit Margin 1M% 20.6% *5% 17.3% 313% 19.8% 21.7% 14.9%
Sales/Employee $R Th 436.3 Th $45.3 Th 5512.0 Th W JITh 5535.9Th IW2Th 5551.6 Th
Income/Employee ST774h 580.1 Th mS.Th 88.7 Th hII Th $106.2 Th $117.0 Th 582.0Th
Retum on Equity 7% 27.5% RI% 24A% 31% 24.2% 216% 16.9%
Return on Assets 1.0% 17.9% 16,7% 13.1% 1.2% 110% l1.% 8.5%
PEG (Historical Growth) IAK 1.Ox 1.x 2.2x 1.x 2.6x 1.m -2.2K
Beta ,2 0.3 03 0.1 ,5 0.6 06 0.6
Annual Dividend $31.0 1.28 1.47 $1.64 $1.81 $1.U 8.12 2.26-
Dividend Yield 1.% 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 30% 3.0% U4% 3A%
All values in the Fuidamentas table are calculated usng flscal year data Wness oheAise noted
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PeerComiaris. RaiosAll values are forthe lat fisal~a ir uionu ntiha -, notedCompay Name (Ticker Symbol) P/E (4/3V12) High P/E Low PE PEG Ratio Pfte to Eingu
Johnse. & John.on (JNJ) 1- .g *1 *1.2 *-2
Pfizer Inc (PFE) 20.6 21.0 15.0 45
Novartis AG (NVS) 15.5 11.3 145 7.5
Roche Holding AG (RHHBY) NA NA NA 2.1
Merck & Co Inc. (MRK) 17.4 17.5 13.1 -1.0
Glaxosmithkine PLC (GSK) 14.9 15.3 12.5 1.9
High and Low PIE are for traing twelve months using diuted EPS excluding extraordinary Rens. PEG ratios historicaL
Valuation
W Mo
Line charts below give a 5 year history for JNJ and up to 5 peers.
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Fig. A. 17. Johnson & Johnson: company performance in comparison to its industry segment
(2004 - 2012).
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Fix. A. 18 Management effectiveness of Johnson & Johnson in comparison to selected peers in
its industry segment.
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Selected Financial Data: Merck & Company
Fix. A.19. Merck & Company (MRK) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price
(2004 - 2012).
Table A.7. Merck & Company (MRK) key financial data (2004 - 2012).
2004 2005 2006 2007 201 20N 2010 2011 2012
Price/Earnings
Price/Sales
Price/Book Value
Price/Cash Flw
Gross Margin
Profit Margin
Sales/Employee
Income/Employee
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
PEG (Historical Growth)
Beta
Annual Dividend
Dividend Yield
12
RA%
248%
S374,3Th
a. Th
U%
13.7%
-Z1x
.3$1.1
4.7%
15.1x
3.9x
11.3K
8.9%
21.0%
21.5x
42x
Ux
15.9x
8&4%
196%
8357.9Th P7.3 Th
$75.3 Th $3,9Th
25.8% 2L2%
10.3% 9%
-1.2x -1.x
0.5 0.8
81.53 1.53
4.8% 3.5%
ANl values In the Fundamenits table are calculated using Tiscalyear data unless othewnise noted
30.0x
5.2x
6.x
263x
82.9%
13.5%
$404.6 Th
58 Th
18.0%
6.8%
-2.3x
0.6
81.52
2.6%
41x
2.7x
3AK
8&%
32.7%$432. Th
$141.6 Th
41.6%
1.5%
144K
$1.54
S%
61%
4.1xlix1.9x
7.5x
82.0%
47.0%
$274.3 Th
$129.0 Th
21.8%
11.5%
0.2K
0.9$1.16
4.2%
12L7x
2AK
2AK
to%
NS2Th
$&2 Th
1.%
U5%
40K
.7$1SS
42%
18.7Wx
2A4
2.1x
8,7x
80.%
13.1%
558.7 Th
872.9Th
11.5%
6.0%
-1.lK
0.7
$1.55
4.1%
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Peer Comparine Reuas
Company Name (Tocker Symbol)
Merck & Ce be. (MEI0 -
Glaxosmithklne PLC (GSK)
Roche Holding AG (RHIHBY)
Novartis AS (NVS)
Sanofi (SNY)
Abbott Laboratories (ABT)
All values are for d atfsa eruis tews oa
PIE (4/W2) High P/E Low P/E PEG Raie Pfie D Emans
*17.4
14.9
NA
15.5
12.5
193
*17.5
15.3NA
123
*111
12.5
NA
its
I45
*-t.
1.92.17.1
1.2
High and Low PIE are for traing welve months using diuted EPS excluding extraordinary Items. PEG rallo Is historical
lion cms1gI'w~ai
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Line charts below give a 5 year history for MRK and up to 5 pee
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Fig. A.20. Merck & Company: company performance in comparison to its industry segment
(2004 - 2012).
BeIinueuAeeeis~%~
175
007
en aE (
01
Fix. A.21. Management effectiveness of Merck & Company in comparison to selected peers in
its industry segment.
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Selected Financial Data: Novartis Pharmaceuticals
Fig. A.22. Novartis AG (NVS) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price (2004 -
2012).
Table A.8. Novartis AG (NVS) key financial data (2004 - 2012).
Fadamentals 2004 2005 20M6 2007 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012
Price/Earnings 21. 20.Ox 19Ax 194x 1&OX 14.8x 13K 15.1x -
Price/Sales 4 3X 3 .7x 3.2x 2 2K 2.7x 23x
Price/Book Value 3x 3.x 3. 2.5x 2.x 2.2x 2.Ix 2.1x
Price/Cash Flow 17.x 16Sx 15. 14.x 10I 11.6x 11k 9.9x
Gross Margin R% 76.5% R*% 77.7% 71.0% 77.6% 77.1% 76.0%
Profit Margin 20A% 19.0% 194% 17.1% 19.6% 19.0% 193% 15.5%
Sales/Employee 8347.Th S354.3 Th 577Th $387.7 Th W.7 Th 443.4Th MU2Th $474.5 Th
Income/Employee $1Th X7ATh S.4 Th 866.4Th 86. Th 884.1 Th I.*Th 8737 Th
Return on Equity 17.1% 166% 16.% 13.2% 1.2% 14.6% 145% 13.8%
Return on Assets 10.6% 10.6% 10.3% 8.6% 1.4% 18% 7.9% 7.6%
PEG (Historical Growth) 1x 2.4x 1Ax 3Ix 1K 1.9k 7.5K
Beta 1 0.0 0.2 0.4 .3 0.6 0.5
Annual Dividend 8181 80.90 S.87 $1.15 $1.48 $1.73 $1.6 32.23
Dividend YId 1.5% 1.7% 1.6% 2.0% 3.1% 3.1% &3% 4.1%
All values In the Fundamentaistable are calculated using fiscal year data uniessothenulse noted
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Company Name (Ticker Symbol) P/E (4M112) High P/E Low PE PEG Ratio Price I Eigs
Nevrds AG (NVS) - 15.5 IU 145 7.5 '*E
Roche Holdmg AG (RHHBY) NA NA NA 2.
Merck & Co Inc. (MRK) -17 17.6 111 -1.0
Glaxosmithkline PLC (GSK) 14.9 153 12.5 1.9
Sanofi ISNY) 12.5 13.3 10.1 1.2 143
Abbott Laboratories (ABT) 19.3 114 144 -47 .m M, 2~1; 21 131
High and Low PE are for traing twelve months using diluted EPS exckuding extraordnary llems. PE6 ratio Is Nstorical.
Line charts below give a 5 year history for NVS and up to 5 peers
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Fix. A.23. Novartis AG: company performance in comparison to its industry segment (2004 -
2012).
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Fig.A.24. Management effectiveness of Novartis AG in comparison to selected peers in its
industry segment.
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Selected Financial Data: Pfizer Inc.
Fia. A.25. Pfizer's (PFE) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price (2004 - 2012).
Table A.9. Pfizer (PFE) key financial data (2004 - 2012).
Fumimesmals
Price/Earnings
Price/Sales
Price/Book Value
Price/cash Flow
Gross Margin
Profit Margin
Sales/Employee
Income/Employee
Return on Equity
Return on Assets
PEG (Historical Growth)
Beta
Annual Dividend
Dividend Yield
2004 2005 2005 207 2008 2000 2010 2011 2012
so
s
ilk0 21Ax 17.k 19.3x 14k9x 14.8x 17.2x 195K -
3o 3.3x 3& 3.2x 2& 2.1K LIx 2Ax -
lx 2.6x 2S 2.4x 2Ix 1Ix 1AK 2.X -
12.2x 12.k 11X 11.5x RIx 11AK UK .2x -
U,9% 88.0% 0.2% 8.2% 9.1% 86.4% 816% 83.9% -
21.% 15.8% 229% 17.0% 1&.% 17.3% 122% 12.9% -
7 Th 483.9Th $4*1W.Th 5556.7Th 131.6Th 428.6 Th M129 Th 50,2Th -
,5Th $76A Th $112.Th 94.8 Th SRI Th 574.0 Th $747 Th 839 Th-
11,6% 12.4% 1.5% 12.6% 140% 9.6% 4% 10.6% -
92% 6.9% 9% 7.1% 72% 4.0% 42% 4.6%
2k -2.3x 0.2x -2.6X LX -2.2x 4 -8.5x -
0,4 0.5 0.6 0.7 15 0. .7 0.7 -
M,70 50.81 $1.02 $1.21 $1.28 0.61 1.74 80.86 -
2.5% 3.3% 17% 5.1% 7.2% 4L4% 41% 3.7% ~
All values In the Fundamentals ble are calculated using fiscal year data unless othenuIse noted
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Peer CoparisonRatiosAll values are for the las fiscal v~r unless otherwise notedCompany Name (Ticker Symbol) PIE (4/27/12) High P/E law P/E PEG Ratio
Pflzer lc PFE) -2. 21. 15.0 4
Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) 17. 1.7 162 -2.2
Novartis AG INVS) 15.5 18.3 145 7,5
Roche Holding AG (RHHBY) NA NA NA 2,1
Glaxosmithkline PLC (GSK) 15.0 153 1Z5 1.9
Merck & Co Inc. (MRK) 17.1 17.5 1.1 -1.0
High and Low P/E are for trailing twelve moths usg dluted EPS excludng extraordinary Items. PEG rato is historical.
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Line charts below give a 5 year history for PE and up to 5 peers.
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Fig. A.26 Pfizer (PFE): company performance in comparison to its industry segment (2004 -
2012).
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Fix. A.27. Management effectiveness of Pfizer in comparison to selected peers in its industry
segment.
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Selected Financial Data: Roche Holdings
Price & Eaming History
PkanCahbYearEPS SLO2WS 11.5S WI UP *85 I5fs v1 EPS RAEFS IWW Ulf 3 EPS
Voksne by Pnce t
2004 20 20 M 200 27 206 7 2D9 21 2011 2012
Fig. A.28. Roche Holdings (RHHBY) price and earnings history as a function of its stock price
(2004 - 2012).
rable A.10. Roche Holdings (RHHBY) key financial data (2004 - 2012).
Fuendaetals 2004 205 206 2007 2O 2009 2010 2011 2012
Price/Earnings 17.Ok 29.3x 24.1x 17.3x &k9 19Ax I 14&5x -
Price/Sales 34 4.X 43x 3Ax 29k 2Ox 2 3& -
Price/Book Value . 4k 3.9x 3.Gx 3.1x 20.lx 12.2K 11.K -
Price/Cash Flow l25 20.5k 1I 134x 120K 14.2x 1i2K 11Ax -6
Gross Margin 762% 78.5% 7,3% 76% 7X.9% 76.7% 714% 78.9% -
Profit Margin N1% 15.7% 13.2% 202% 1.7% 15,2% 17.6% 21.2% -
Sales/Employee $4.1Th $411ATh $75.4Th 5432 Th S.5Th 3605.9 Th UK7Th 3587.3 Th -
income/Employee RS iTh 864.7 Th U.7Th $100.6 Th $10.Th S92.2Th $114,7 Th $124,4Th -
Return on Equity 215% 16.6% 1,8% 21.5% A2% 10,7% 91.5% 77.2% -
Return on Assets 11A% 8.4% 136% 12.5% 11.8% 10.4% 14.2% 15.2% -
PEG (Historical Growth) 0 K 2.Lx 0.7x 1.x l07x 3.5x 4AK 2.1x -
Beta 5 0.7 .7 0.6 1 0.5 14 0.5 -
Annual Dividend 31 50.39 .52 80.56 $1.0 $1.22 M1 $1.79 -
Dividend Yield 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.6% 2.9% 2.5% 18% 4.2% -
AN values in the Fundamentls table are calculated using fiscal year data unless otherise noted
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Peer omparson RtiosAN values are for the las fiscal ar unless otherwise noted.Company Name (Ticker Symbol) P/E (4/W12) High P/E Low P/E PEG Ratio PitelloEminug
Roche Holding AG (RHHBY)-- NA NA NA 11
Novartis AG (NVS) 15.5 1.3 Its 7.5
Merck & Co Inc. (MRK) 17A 17.S 131 -1.0
Glaxoamithkline PLC (GSK) 14.9 15.3 12.5 1.9
Sanofi(SNY) 12.5 1W3 1.LI 1.2 _ _ _ _
Abbott Laboratories (ABT) 19.3 114 14 -R7 s- Wi ni 11
High and Low PIE are for traling twlve moniths using diluted EPS excluding extraordinary Items. PEG ratio is historical.
Valuation Line charts below give a 5 year history for 3RHHBY and up to 5 peers.
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Fij. A.29. Roche Holdings (RHHBY): company performance in comparison to its industry
segment (2004 - 2012).
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Fi. A.30. Management effectiveness of Roche in comparison to selected peers in its
industry segment.
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